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Chapter 1 
Introduction and the Effect of Consociationalism on Democratic Governance 
 
My thesis is primarily a study of the effect of consociational, power-
sharing, arrangements on shared governance in post-conflict societies.  
Specifically, I look into how the formality of minority vetoes in consociational 
parliaments affects the level of inter-ethnoreligious political party cooperation in 
the legislative process. I wanted to choose two different case studies based on the 
presence of formal (written) or informal (implicit) minority vetoes in their 
consociational parliaments. I chose Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon due to their 
difference in minority veto formality and the number of controls I can account for 
between both countries.   This chapter provides an overview of what constitutes a 
consociational government and why it is implemented.  I will also discuss the 
development of my hypothesis, theory, and methodology, after I consider the 
literature on consociationalism. 
Here I review the literature written about consociationalism, specifically 
how this type of “democracy” affects the process of post-ethnic war societal and 
governmental development.  I will focus on literature about the decision-making 
processes involved in the implementation of consociational agreements, in 
addition to case studies that explore how consociationalism has affected post-
conflict governmental evolution in deeply-divided societies.  Thus, the scope of 
my literature review extends from analyzing the theory and methodology behind 
implementing consociational democracy to qualitative and quantitative research 
on the effects of consociationalism on governmental effectiveness.  The primary 
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purpose of this discourse is to see whether the available literature on 
consociationalism explores how varying levels of institutionalized power-sharing 
arrangements affect political party formation and subsequent inter-party 
interactions.  This will be beneficial to my research since it focuses on 
investigating to what extent these varying levels of power-sharing rigidity affect 
inter-ethnic political party cooperation for governance.  More specifically, I seek 
to explore how the presence of minority vetoes in post-war deeply-divided 
societies affects inter-ethnoreligious party cooperation and interaction, i.e. how 
varying levels of rigidity (from formal [i.e. written] to informal [i.e. understood] 
of minority vetoes either facilitate or hinder cross-party interactions.  Thus, my 
hypothesis is that the more a minority veto is formally institutionalized in a post-
war deeply-divided society, the more difficult it will be for ethnoreligious parties 
to cooperate.  In sum, this chapter will be helpful in fleshing out how 
consociationalism affects the viability of a non-stagnant multiparty democratic 
system in post-ethnic war societies. 
 I have divided this chapter into four sections.  First, I review literature 
written about the theoretical foundations of consociationalism, focusing on how 
these works describe when consociationalism is appropriate. Second, I review 
literature that focuses on explaining why consociationalism is not always the most 
appropriate for deeply-divided societies.  Third, I review literature about specific 
instances of implemented consociational democracy, including but not limited to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon, to see the varying effects of “applied” 
consociationalism.  Lastly, I discuss my research design. 
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Theoretical Foundations of Consociationalism 
 It is appropriate to begin with Lijphart, who has been given the title “the 
father of consociationalism.”  His preliminary works revolve around what should 
comprise the structure and nature of consociational agreements.  Thus, even 
though the concept of consociationalism was present in literature before Lijphart’s 
works, he is credited with creating the definition that is still in use today 
(Andeweg, 510).  Lijphart’s definition of consociationalism is a “government by 
elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a 
stable democracy” (Lijphart, 216). Thus, consociational democracy was 
engineered to counterbalance the “destabilizing effect of social segmentation” 
(Andeweg, 510).  According to Andeweg (510), these social segmentations can 
arise from two possible sources: the presence of deep societal cleavages (Lijphart, 
207) and the inability of voting maximization (i.e. the ability to gain numerous 
votes during elections) to take place in a democratic system due to limited 
mobility between social segments (Lehmbruch, 91).  I believe Lijphart has 
contributed a vast amount to the literature on consociationalism, regarding how a 
government can be structured in deeply-divided societies. However, his theory 
does not address deeply-divided societies that have ingrained ethnoreligious 
cleavages, such that the political elites in these societies make little or no attempt 
to finding grounds for cooperation. In addition, he places too large of an emphasis 
on the fabrication of the governmental structure of consociational societies and 
does not provide much explanation as to how to deal with the ensuing societal 
structure – even with the most meticulous governmental engineering, there is no 
8 
 
guarantee that the political elites and constituents will use the system as dictated 
or prescribed.  As I will discuss later, Lijphart puts aside these important aspects 
of deeply-divided societies that need discussion, by stating that his method of 
consociationalism preassumes elite cooperation.   
For the most part, Lijphart argues in favor of implementing 
consociationalism in heterogeneous societies.  He defines heterogeneous societies 
as those that do not follow the practices of homogenous societies (e.g. Anglo-
Saxon societies), with deeply fragmented societies being the extreme case of 
heterogeneity (Lijphart, 215).  Societies that need to find “overlapping 
memberships,” i.e. a consensus that spans different societal segments in order to 
show that they are in favor of such an agreement, are also heterogeneous (209).  
Additionally, he argues that “political culture and social structure are empirically 
related to political stability,” where homogenous societies, which share a similar 
political and social structure throughout their histories, are more inclined to 
political stability (208).  Nonetheless, he does list several successful 
heterogeneous European governments (such as post-1945 Austria and post-
democratic Belgium), who, despite their different minority groups, were able to 
find “overlapping memberships” to reach “cross-cutting” consensuses regarding 
governance (208).  Thus, in order to facilitate such inter-group relationships, the 
“main political institutions” of consociational democracy, according to Lijphart, 
are a grand coalition (joint consensual rule between the minority groups), a 
mutual veto (vetoes granted to all the minority groups), proportional 
representation (“fair and equal treatment instead of the disproportionality in favor 
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of majorities” as seen in majority rule representation in government based upon 
population break-down), and segmental autonomy (“minority rule over the 
minority itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern”) (Binningsbø, 2 
and Lijphart, 113).    
Nonetheless, he does provide the caveat that a society can suffer from 
such deep cleavages, that the “pressure toward moderate middle-of-the-road 
attitudes are absent” (Lijphart, 209).  I believe this is strongly related to the point 
he makes that, “the essential characteristic of a successful consociational 
democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the 
deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system” (213).  His statement 
sheds light on the reality that the success of consociationalism is largely 
contingent on whether elites are able to set aside their differences and work 
together, adding a difficult dimension to consociationalism, such that its success 
is largely based on factors that cannot be significantly shaped through institutional 
design and engineering.  Nonetheless, even though he acknowledges that political 
immobilization can arise from consociationalism, he believes these instances are 
not the norm.  Lijphart states the system structure (i.e. the presence of a grand 
coalition, quotas in public offices, and vital interest veto in addition to the degree 
of territorial autonomy, with higher levels of each indicating more chances of 
political stability) and societal structure (i.e. greater levels of homogeneity), in 
addition to the willingness of elites, can help determine the success of 
consociational agreements (210-211). 
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Criticism of Lijphart 
Nonetheless, many of the consociational agreements implemented since 
his article was written in 1965 have resulted in immobilized political systems 
(Seaver, 247 and 252). For example, present-day, politically deadlocked Lebanon 
is a stark contrast to 1940’s Lebanon, which Lijphart used as an example for 
“successful” consociationalism (248).  Plus, Cyprus’s short-lived attempt at 
consociational democracy from 1960-1963 failed due to the unwillingness of 
Turkish and Greek elites to cooperate together (248).  Even though the small 
countries of Europe (Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) Lijphart used as 
examples of successful consociationalism have not experienced the debilitating 
effects from implementing consociationalism of the previous examples, scholars, 
such as Seaver and Barry, argue that these countries are not truly consociational in 
nature (e.g. missing some of the four main political institutions of 
consociationalism) (Barry, 481 and Seaver, 252).  In addition, they have 
experienced other factors that might have played a larger role in stabilizing their 
political system, such as their high levels of economic prosperity after the Second 
World War (Seaver, 252). 
As discussed before, the “main political institutions,” of consociational 
democracy, according to Lijphart, are a grand coalition, a mutual veto, 
proportional representation, and segmental autonomy (Binningsbø, 2).  
Nonetheless, the fact that the success of consociationalism and its key institutions 
is contingent upon the motivation, capability, and cooperation of political elites, 
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in addition to the presence of the “proper environment” for a consociational 
democracy, makes it difficult to argue that Lijphart’s consociational democracy’s 
successes are replicable.  As seen in the following list, six of the eight (excluding 
1, 2, and 3) conditions necessary for the success of a consociational democracy 
are partly dependent on the willingness of elite groups to cooperate with one 
another: 
1. Presence of an external threat 
2. Multiple balances of power among subcultures 
3. Relatively low total load on the decision-making apparatus 
4. Distinct cleavages and clear boundaries between subcultures 
5. Development of a deeper sense of mutual awareness and 
responsiveness among encapsulated cultural units 
6. Internal political cohesion of the subcultures 
7. Adequate articulation of the interests of the subcultures 
8. Widespread approval of the principle of government by the elite 
cartel (217-222) 
 
Lijphart does spend time explaining the difficulty of promoting elite 
cooperation through his case study of understanding the failure of the French 
Fourth Republic (the inability, and unwillingness, of the Republic to create 
solutions) (Democracy in Plural Societies, 114-117).  Nonetheless, the French 
Fourth Republic, though fragmented in terms of ideology, was not a 
consociational government.  Lijphart should have examined an example of failed 
consociationalism, due to the unwillingness of elites to cooperate, to make it 
relevant to his argument.  Nonetheless, his point, and one that I believe is 
important to consider in consociational contexts, is that it is not easy to assume 
elites will be rational actors and cooperate when there is a clear incentive to be 
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gained for their respective constituent group.  As I will later discuss in my review 
of Arfi’s work, elites, especially those who have a clear monopoly on power in a 
power-sharing system, have a tendency to be unwilling to make strides towards 
the betterment of the state, if that means they will have to relinquish some of their 
maximized power (Arfi, 257).  When the success of a governmental structure is 
based more on the decisions of its actors than on its institutional arrangement, it 
adds an additional level of insecurity to governance, that many post-war and 
otherwise divided countries may find to be a large, if not obstructive, burden.  
However, Arfi does not spend enough time exploring the alternatives to 
consociationalism when elites refuse to, or cannot, cooperate.  Nevertheless, I do 
not believe this piece was written to be overly comprehensive. Through the 
following quote, “[C]onsociational democracy presupposes not only a willingness 
on the part of elites to cooperate but also a capability to solve the political 
problems of the country,” it is evident that his primary concern is to highlight how 
consociationalism can work, given the proper environment, as listed in the 
previous paragraph (218). 
Alternatives to Lijphart’s Consociational Democracy 
My analysis of Lijphart’s piece on consociational democracy, after 
reviewing his work in addition to others, is similar to what other scholars have 
concluded as well.  Horowitz’s approach, written in response to Ljiphart’s, spells 
out reasons why consociationalism is often not appropriate for divided societies. 
He argues that identities are not static: Horowitz states there is “potential for 
fluidity” and saliency between different ethnic groups. He states that “[e]xtreme 
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forms of ethnic exclusion require a legal framework that is ultimately inimical to 
democratic principles” (Horowitz, 25).  Furthermore, he sees the process of 
inclusion and exclusion as a cyclical one (27). He puts it interestingly, when 
“opponents do unite, that is not because they have suppressed their differences, 
but because those differences are not yet relevant…they become relevant…when 
it is time to decide who will rule” (27).  Thus, Horowitz argues that there must be 
inclusiveness and flexibility in a system of governance in a deeply-divided society 
that allows for the changing of, and movement between, different identities.  
Ljiphart’s approach to identity, similar to what is present in current-day Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where ethnic identity is the foundation of divisions in government, 
is prone to ingraining ethnic cleavages, thus yielding an inefficient governmental 
structure (Caspersen, 573).  Caspersen indicates that the most visible elements of 
the Dayton Peace Accords, current-day Bosnia-Herzegovina’s notable power-
sharing mechanism, are consociational (e.g. joint institutions and ethnic 
autonomy) and thus fall under Lijphart’s model (573).  Lebanon also has 
consociational power-sharing mechanisms in its governing structure, e.g. 
confessionally-based positions of top governmental leaders and proportional 
representation in parliament, government, and public administration (Salamey and 
Payne, 453). 
Nevertheless, more “integrative institutions,” such as those that Horowitz 
advocates for, also have drawbacks: because they are based on ethic equality, 
there is no veto mechanism present in integrative systems.  Thus, ethnic groups 
run a risk of being outvoted and subject to “majority rule”…a risk that 
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consociational agreements avoids.  Caspersen states that because of the 
aforementioned problems with each type of system, support for consociational or 
integrative institutions varies in practice according to what ethnic groups fear.  
Ethnic groups that see themselves as marginalized minorities, such as the Croat 
community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will favor consociational structures because 
they desire the assurance they will have representation in government, despite 
their demographic size.  Nonetheless, ethnic groups that perceive themselves to be 
the majority (I use the words “see” and “perceive” because there has not been an 
official census in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991) will prefer integrative 
institutions because they allow them more governmental maneuverability, in 
addition to guaranteeing that they can pass a law with a majority vote, all the 
while not having to worry about it being blocked via an ethnic veto.  A similar 
situation is present in Lebanon, a country who also has not had an official census 
since 1932 (Salemey and Payne, 452).  The lack of an updated census is due to the 
political elites’ unwillingness to address the stark population changes in the 
country since 1932.  This unwillingness is due to both stability concerns and 
incentive-based reasons, which include the realization that the Christians would 
have to relinquish their slight majority (the Muslims now hold the population 
majority due to large refugee influxes from the Palestinian territories and the 
increasing emigration of the Christians out of the country) (455).  Thus, 
integrative institutions would be preferable to the ethnic groups that either hold 
the majority in the country, as dictated in censuses (the Christians in Lebanon), or 
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those who are the actual majority and want to hold more power (the Muslims in 
Lebanon). 
“Effectiveness” of Consociationalism 
 It is equally important to give recognition to research that has investigated 
the effectiveness of consociationalism.  However, I believe it is imperative to 
indicate that the term “effectiveness” carries different implications and is 
contingent on what the researcher is looking to investigate as an effect of 
consociationalism.  Thus, “effectiveness” can take on the meaning of successfully 
halting violence or creating a functioning democratic system. The implementation 
of consociationalism can provide successful results towards ending a civil war, 
and granting political and representational equality to the different warring 
factions, in addition to providing a lasting source of peace and stability in what 
was once a conflict-ridden country (Binningsbø, 2-3, Rothchild and Roeder, 5-6). 
Before looking at literature that describes consociationalism’s effect on 
governance, I will review Helga Malmin Binningsbø’s article on consociational 
democracy’s effects on post-civil war peace, where the success of 
consociationalism is not measured in terms of governmental efficiency but rather 
if it can ensure and grant peace (the absence of warfare) in post-conflict 
societies.1 
                                                            
1
 Binningsbø is from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology and International 
Peace Research Institute (PRIO) – renowned for their “Conflict Database and Datasets.” 
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 Binningsbø focuses on investigating whether varying presences of the 
main political institutions of consociationalism, as characterized by Lijphart, 
affect the success of consociationalism in deterring warfare to breakout again in 
post-civil war countries.  As previously mentioned, these “main political 
institutions” are a grand coalition, a mutual veto, proportional representation, and 
segmental autonomy (2).  Her sub-set hypotheses, the ones that collectively 
contribute to her general hypothesis, are as follows.   
First, “[t]he probability of lasting peace is greater in a post-conflict society 
with a grand coalition than in such a society without a grand coalition” (8). 
Second, “[t]he probability of lasting peace is greater in a postconflict 
society with proportional representation than in such a society without 
proportional representation” (9).  Third, “[t]he probability of lasting peace 
is greater in a postconflict society with segmental autonomy than in such a 
society without segmental autonomy” (10). 
Her definition of segmental autonomy is “decisions…concerning the 
different segments” being decided separately (9).  These issues can concern 
questions about, but are not limited to, “religion, language, and education” (9).  
Additionally, segmental autonomy can be based upon “personal self-
identification” or territorial separations (9).These three hypotheses combined lead 
to her fourth, and thus general, hypothesis which is “[t]he more power-sharing 
institutions in a postconflict society, the higher the probability of lasting peace” 
(10). Her fifth and final hypothesis, which takes into account Lijphart’s claim that 
smaller countries are better suited for consociationalism, is that “[t]he smaller a 
postconflict society, the greater the probability of lasting peace” (13).  Lijphart 
argues that, in smaller countries, leaders know one another better and thus, are 
more willing to work with one another (Lijphart, 221).  Additionally, he argues 
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that smaller countries are easier to govern due to their smaller territorial size 
(221). 
 The interesting aspect of Binningsbø’s work is that it is one of the few 
quantitative studies done on the effect of consociationalism on peacebuilding 
(30).  Using logit analysis, multivariate regression models, and crosstabulation, 
Binningsbø finds statistical significance in the correlation that “granting regions 
in conflict-ridden societies some sort of autonomy” reduces the likelihood the 
country will revert back to violence (21).  However, as Binningsbø points out, her 
definition of territorial autonomy does not imply that the different ethnoreligious 
groups are “demographically separated” (21).  Thus, her claim that her findings 
correlate to Kaufmann’s findings, that ethnic partitioning is a solution to ethnic 
wars, is slightly overambitious since Kaufmann’s findings are dependent on the 
fact that the different ethnic groups are separated in order to achieve peace (21).  
Another claim she makes without substantial evidence besides her statistical 
findings, is that “high-intensity conflicts are more likely to achieve lasting peace 
than low-intensity conflicts” (21).  I understand her argument about how the 
duration of a conflict has a negative influence on lasting peace.  Nevertheless, she 
does not expand on the logic behind this relationship.  The only explanation she 
provides is, “[d]uration is often correlated with intensity, which might explain 
why it is different in my analyses compared to other research” (21). 
Nonetheless, I believe her empirical work has something to offer to 
peacebuilding literature, particularly her finding that the sole presence of a grand 
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coalition (meaning no other power-sharing institutions in place) in a post-conflict 
country has a negative impact on post-conflict stability, meaning an increased 
chance in whether the country will revert back to violence (e.g. Angola and 
Burundi) (24).  Additionally, she claims that though state size does have a impact 
on the successfulness of consociational democracy, with smaller states being 
more successful, they still have high probabilities of lasting peace, regardless of 
whether consociational features “are present or not” (23).2  Nonetheless, as the 
size of the country increases, the difference “between having and not having” 
consociational features, such as proportional representation and territorial 
autonomy, “has a larger effect on Binningsbø’s lasting peace variable (23).  These 
findings actively call into question the effectiveness of one of Lijphart’s idealized 
power-sharing institutions, particularly the one concerning the negative effect of 
having just a grand coalition (she does though find that it is “positively related to 
lasting peace” when present in conjunction with other power-sharing institutions, 
which in fact supports Lijphart’s argument that consociationalism requires all four 
power-sharing institutions to be present) (27).  Again, I believe it is important to 
realize that Binningsbø’s work strived to show how consociationalism is helpful 
in peacebuilding (i.e. ensuring the absence of violence) rather than creating a 
functioning government (i.e. not fraught with decision-making immobilization), 
let alone democracy-building.  Thus, it is necessary to investigate 
                                                            
2
 Her country size variable, in square kilometers accounting for both land and water area, is 
collected from the CIA World Factbook’s 2003 statistics.  She transforms this variable using the 
natural logarithm (because she assumes size will have a diminishing effect on peace) and has a 
range of 7-17ln for her size variable (16 and 23). 
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consociationalism’s effect on governmental effectiveness, once peace is achieved, 
which I will demonstrate through my review of the literature regarding 
consociational democracy’s effect on statebuilding.  
 The inability of power-sharing agreements in providing a viable means of 
post-conflict governance is explored by Roeder and Rothchild who present a 
collection of different views about why power-sharing agreements do not, for the 
large part, work.   In addition, some of the collected works in Roeder and 
Rothchild focus on explaining alternative options for post-conflict governance, 
such as “power-dividing,” in which the “ethnic stakes in politics [are lowered] by 
taking the most divisive cultural or identity issues out of the hands of government 
[and into the hands of] civil society” (Roeder, 342).  Roeder and Rothchild begin 
their introduction with an attention-grabbing statement that largely explains the 
role power-sharing agreements play in post-conflict societies over time: “[t]he 
very same institutions that provide an attractive basis to end a conflict in an 
ethnically divided country are likely to hinder the consolidation of peace and 
democracy over the longer term” (Roeder 6).  This “inconsistency between short-
term benefits and longer-term costs” is what they coin the “dilemma of power-
sharing” (6).  In short, they explain in the introduction why the most popular post-
conflict governance systems do not work, and begin to show how power-dividing 
is better-suited to providing a post-conflict governance system that will function 
efficiently over the long-run. 
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 To expand, they list the three “traditional choices” that come into play in 
post-conflict countries: a) choosing between majority democracy and power-
sharing (as discussed in Lijphart’s works), b) deciding whether to establish a 
foreign protectorate, and c) deciding whether to partition the state (as described 
by Kaufmann whom I briefly mentioned before, in addition to Sambanis) (9).  
Roeder and Rothchild’s argument against power-sharing is rooted in how the 
demographic structure of typical “power-sharing agreement prone” societies, i.e. 
deeply-divided countries, works against its potential efficiency.  As Roeder and 
Rothchild state, “[p]ower-sharing strategy embraces three main objectives: 
inclusive government, group self-government, and proportionality” (9).  However, 
they argue that the “incentives created by power-sharing institutions” provide 
opportunities for, and encourages, nationalist elites to increasingly prioritize their 
own gains (9).  This point, as they further explain, is evident in current cases of 
countries with stagnant power-sharing structures - a problematic environment 
when it comes to ethnic elites refusing to forsake some of their own power and 
gains for the betterment of the country.  As Lijphart originally noted, 
consociationalism presupposes elites’ willingness to cooperate.  However, as 
exemplified by the current actions of the current president of the Republika Srpka, 
Milorad Dodik, some ethnic elites, once given power, are reluctant to cooperate 
with the other ethnic elites, if no clear incentive for their respective ethnic groups 
is promised (Touquet, 270). 
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Qualitative Analysis of Consociationalism 
 To continue my review of elites’ role in power-sharing structure, I 
examined Badredine Arfi’s historical and qualitative analysis of several 
multiethnic states, with the two main countries and time periods of analysis being 
pre-1991 Yugoslavia and confessional Lebanon (250).  Arfi’s focus of research 
was on intercommunity interaction in deeply-divided countries and how that 
affected the form of state governance and intercommual interactions in the 
political sphere.  His first conclusion was that “[t]he greater the sense of 
intercommunal interdependence among the politicized communal groups in the 
polity, the more likely they will be to seek to debate the existing form of state 
governance to deal with the fundamental changes occurring in the international 
environment” (253).  Conversely, he found that as fear of domination by other 
ethnic groups increased, the likelihood that the different ethnic communities 
would engage in conversation about the government decreased, particularly if 
these conversations would involve topics such as reform and reallocation of 
power (256).  The examples he provided as the best illustrators of this 
circumstance were Lebanon (1973-1976) and Yugoslavia (1987-1991) (255).  It is 
surprising to note that he did not mention that both these time periods in both 
countries encompassed the lead-up to their major civil wars, in addition to 
preliminary ethnoreligious violence.  Though he states his hypothesis was backed 
up by qualified historical accounts, I believe since he did not account for 
preliminary mobilization (both militarily and psychologically) for ethnic war, this 
brings into question whether other variables help explain the failure to engage in 
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conversation about the government (Gagnon and Zahar).  Additionally, during 
this time period Yugoslavia was still a one-party, authoritarian government and 
thus, in terms of governmental structure, is not comparable to Lebanon’s 
confessional democracy. 
Arfi’s hypotheses that revolve around how perceptions of intercommunal 
interactions affect the functionality of governments in multiethnic societies are 
particularly relevant to my research question.  Though he does not explicitly use 
the term power-sharing agreements, I believe his implication is that the 
governmental structures he is analyzing account for some sort of multiethnic 
representation, i.e. confessional Lebanon. Thus, his independent variable is how 
the level of trust (or distrust) between the different ethnic communities in 
multiethnic states affects the system of governance.  For example, his conclusion 
that “[t]he more rapidly expected intercommunal vulnerability declines, the more 
politicized communal groups are able to construct a form of state governance with 
a higher degree of [cross-communal consent]” shows how ethnic groups use the 
state government as a mechanism to relay “good will” between one another as 
their relationship grows stronger (Arfi, 256).  This is an interesting finding, but I 
believe it requires some additional explanation.  He provides more clarity 
regarding his conclusion that as a dominant group has stronger institutional 
power, it becomes more likely that it will “rely on institutional power to shape the 
outcome of [state governance debates]” (257).  In sum, Arfi’s final conclusion ties 
together the previous conclusions that I have reviewed: “[t]he more rapidly the 
reliance on institutional power increases the more rapidly intercommunal trust 
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decreases, and the more rapidly the scope of collective intentionality decreases” 
(259).  
Case Studies of Consociationalism 
In my next and final section, I will delve more deeply into literature that 
describes how power-sharing rigidity affects governmental efficiency by looking 
at two case studies; first, Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Lebanon.  First, I will 
review a piece by Florian Bieber, a prominent scholar of the Balkans, on 
institutional engineering looks at two cities within Bosnia-Herzegovina that have 
two different approaches regarding the rigidity of power-sharing, which 
influences the effectiveness of their governments.  In Brčko, a less formal system 
of power-sharing was used, where as in Mostar, a system of “complex 
consociationalism” was in place (Bieber, 420).  Thus, Bieber suggests that “less 
formal systems of power-sharing [i.e. Brčko]…have been more successful than 
the complex consociationalism and territorial fragmentation of post-war Mostar” 
(420).  What is key in Bieber’s argument is how he defines informal and complex 
consociationalism.  He defines informal as the lack of formal power-sharing 
features, such as no veto rights for ethnic communities (426).  Thus, a formal, or 
written, power-sharing arrangement would be one that does have such features 
and where the emphasis is on ensuring that no one community would have an 
outright majority (423). For Mostar’s case, the fact that it was subjected to both 
local and cantonal governments caused Bieber to term it as a “complex” system of 
consociationalism (423). It is important to note though, before delving too deep in 
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Bieber’s piece, that Brčko is an anomaly in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general due to 
its unique government structure and “considerable international [executive 
authority] resources and tax advantages over the rest of BiH” (431).  Though 
Bieber takes this account into his piece, he still suggests that Brčko can be used as 
a model for other deeply-divided cities, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
Bieber makes clear the way that war disrupted and changed the ethnic 
makeup of both of these cities.  The shift in which ethnic group emerged as the 
predominant one after the war, outnumbering the historically predominant ethnic 
group, caused disputes over which ethnic group should yield the most power 
(421).  Disputes related to perceptions regarding ethnic predominance still persist 
to this day in Mostar, which continues to exist without a mayor since its elections 
last fall, where a Bosniak victory caused uproar among the Croat community, who 
historically held the mayor seat (ICG report on Mostar).  Bieber suggests that “the 
contested nature of both towns made them a target of the post-war nationalist 
leadership keen to consolidate their grip symbolically and demographically” 
(Bieber, 422). 
Thus, the power struggles that emerged in both cities caused them to be 
keen targets of international intervention and administration.  Nonetheless, the 
international approach in both cities was starkly different.  International efforts in 
Mostar focused on “quick elections,” institutionalizing and ingraining the status 
quo (422).  International efforts in Brčko, on the other hand, focused on 
emphasizing “institution-building and integration before democratic elections,” 
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thus institutions that were “inclusive and flexible” were built before elections took 
place (421-422).  As Bieber suggests, these measures helped to define and dictate 
the nature of power-sharing in both cities.  In Mostar, there was much abuse of 
the power-sharing system, a city in which ethnic quotas ruled the political scene 
(423).  Manipulating the ethnic quota system by placing “other” candidates on 
their ballot lists, allowed the SDA and HDZ to capture seats that were not 
specifically intended for their ethnic groups, and created opportunities for 
outvoting (423-425).  Thus, Mostar’s “six” municipalities operated as though they 
were two: one Croat and one Bosniak (424).  Despite the international 
community, namely the OHR, realizing that Mostar’s power-sharing system was 
in fact “accept[ing] and perpetuat[ing] the postwar status quo,” attempts to change 
the ingrained divisions by uniting Mostar into one municipality have not changed 
the way the city operates; with a rigid power-sharing structure still in place, grand 
coalitions and veto rights are the norm of politics (424-426). 
While Mostar suffered from nationalist leadership and ethnic politics, 
Brčko saw relatively few of the same problems.  It was not until 1999 that Brčko 
was made into an autonomous district under an international arbitrator. Even after 
this, its international administrator “appointed the mayor and all members of the 
assembly until 2004” (426).  Thus, governance in Brčko was largely removed 
from the realm of the political parties and placed into the hands of the 
international community, because of which it lacked formal power-sharing 
mechanisms, such as veto rights, which were replaced by a 3/5 majority 
requirement that prevented the marginalization “of the two large communities, 
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Bosniac and Serb” (426).  What he marks as remarkable, was not that Brčko 
served as a beacon of moderation (Bieber mentions there was not much difference 
behind its ability to promote moderate political parties and Mostar’s), but rather 
that the main political arguments, particularly between Bosnian Serb parties and 
international administrators, were solved through “bargaining behind closed 
doors than in public competition for votes” (429).  Again, the transfer of Brčko’s 
government from the political parties to the international administrators, created 
the opportunity for the ethnic parties to not have to worry about their political 
representation.  Thus, informal, negotiation-based strategies were used to reach 
compromise and cooperation; Brčko was able to make much more progress in 
political decisions than Mostar, where vying for power and claiming a majority in 
seat allocations became the driving force behind local ethnic politics.  
Nonetheless, the success of Brčko’s integrative mechanisms and the number of 
refugees returned should not be solely linked to its political structure.  As 
mentioned before, Brčko’s economic prosperity in addition to the international 
community’s tight grasp on it provided additional facilitators for power-sharing 
effectiveness in Brčko (431). 
Other literature is present that also talks about variances in power-sharing 
agreement formality, where formality is defined as the level of institutionalization 
and rigidity of a power-sharing agreement.   What I found most interesting about 
the case of Lebanon is the different role consociationalism played in the country 
over the span of a little more than half a century.  Consociationalism, in the early 
days of the modern state of Lebanon (around the 1940’s) was hailed to be the 
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“solution” for alleviating its inter-religious tensions (454).  The unwritten 
National Pact of 1943 was a three-fold informal agreement, based upon segmental 
proportionality, segmental autonomy, and foreign policy neutrality, created to 
address governmental vulnerabilities ignored by the French during their rule over 
the country (Zahar, 238). Additionally, it was the first attempt of the different 
religious sects to take accountability for their own actions (recognizing the need 
to stop leveraging their power through international actors) to ensure the stability 
and future of Lebanon as their own state (240).  Nonetheless, as the years 
progressed and the demographic composition of Lebanon changed, in addition to 
uneven economic development among the different religious communities, 
religious elites refused to reassess the consociational structure of Lebanon, and 
instead used it for their own advantages (Salamey and Payne, 455).  Salamey and 
Payne provide examples of elites taking advantage of their lack of accountability 
(due to the awareness that the National Pact and quota system were not 
susceptible to revision), one of which being the “division of the state’s resources, 
including money and jobs, on a sectarian basis” (455).  As consociational 
Lebanon aged, it became evident that there was a least one point of consensus 
between the political elites, which was to keep state power in the hands of 
“political sectarian elites” and undermine measures to improve government 
“commitment to the public good” (455).   
In summary, the National Pact of 1943, was an informal, mutually-
accepted agreement, created by the different sectarian communities in an attempt 
to define and secure their role in Lebanon’s government structure. 
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Simultaneously, the National Pact was made to also ensure that the other sectarian 
groups would not seek outside help, in order to destabilize the country’s balance 
into their favor.  The National Pact, gave the Christian communities a political 
advantage, due to their slight majority (54% of the population), according to the 
1932 census (455).  While the Pact promoted stability in Lebanon during the 
forties, as the country experienced large influxes of Palestinian refugees after 
1948 and a general greater increase in the Muslim population, the static National 
Pact did not accommodate demographic, and thus representational, changes in the 
country.  Tensions arose between the sects, and lead to the outbreak of civil war, 
in 1958 and 1975.  It is arguable that this was not the fault of the agreement, but 
rather the unwillingness of the different sectarian leaders of that time to 
compromise, that lead to civil war (Zahar, 239).   
Conversely, the Ta’if Accords, brokered and implemented in 1989, was a 
formalized power-sharing agreement, that built off of the National Pact, but 
institutionalized consociationalism into domestic politics by redistributing power 
between the three major sects and seats in the Lebanese Parliament, in addition to 
redefining the relationship between Syria and Lebanon (233).  The Ta’if 
Agreement:  
Curtailed the powers of the Maronite President…, entrusted most 
executive powers to the confessionally-mixed Council of Ministers (thus 
yielding significant power to the Sunni Prime Minister), and increased the 
power of the legislature and especially that of the Shi`a House Speaker. 
Ta’if replaced the old 6:5 distribution of seats in Parliament by an equal 
distribution between Christians and Muslims; it also increased the number 
of seats in parliament from 99 to 108 and eventually to 128 (232).   
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Though Lebanon has not reverted to violence since the implementation of the 
Ta’if Agreement, its consociational agreement has not been as successful nor as 
well received as the National Pact of 1943, which had claimed the title for 
Lebanon, “the Switzerland of the Middle East” during the early forties (Safa, 24).  
In fact, due to its tolerant and cooperative confessional government during this 
time period, Lijphart described Lebanon as being one of the models of successful 
consociationalism (Seaver, 248).  Nonetheless, scholars, such as Salamey and 
Payne, argue that Lebanon “continued to experience institutional collapse” despite 
its consociational arrangement (Salamey, 452).  Salamey and Payne argue that 
one of the main causes of the Lebanese government’s failure is a “constantly 
recurring disagreement among confessional elites over power-sharing 
agreements” (452).   
 Nonetheless, through a review of literature on Lebanon, it is apparent that 
the role of international interveners in its political system, in addition to large 
shifts in its demographics (either through refugees influxes from the surrounding 
region or the migration of Lebanese citizens) have also affected the political 
dynamic in the country (Zahar, 243 and Salamey and Payne, 455).  Salamey and 
Payne argue the fact that Lebanon’s population percentages are still defined in 
terms of the 1932 census, the determiner of power-sharing allocation between the 
seventeen different religious groups in Lebanon, the growth of the Muslim 
population since then and the decline of the Christian population, due to 
“progressive increases” in its migration to the West, are both largely ignored 
(Salamey and Payne, 455).  Zahar makes the point that despite the promise of the 
30 
 
sectarian groups in the 1943 Pact to not draw in outside support to strengthen their 
respective groups,  sectarian groups still “drew outsiders into domestic politics to 
redress internal inequalities” in addition to countering perceived threats (Zahar, 
239).  Rather, Lebanon became more susceptible to outside intervention, as 
evidenced by Syria’s increasing and deepening role in Lebanese politics, further 
institutionalized by Syria being declared as a protector of Lebanon in the 1989 
Ta’if Agreement (245).     
Drawing Conclusions from Discourse on Literature 
 As for my question, my review of the previous literature, particularly 
Arfi’s work, has left me with the realization that there are a number of 
understudied, and important, questions that need to be addressed regarding the 
role of ethnic elite cooperation on the effectiveness of consociationalism.   As 
Lijphart and other scholars have mentioned, elite cooperation is one, if not the 
largest, determinant of a consociational democracy’s success, with success 
meaning the creation of a governmental system that is not politically immobilized 
(Lijphart, 213).  But I believe the more important question is not how the elite 
cooperation effects the success of a consociational democracy but rather how the 
structure of consociationalism affects elite cooperation. What if consociationalism 
is implemented in a society with elites that are unwilling to cooperate and 
compromise? Does that mean the consociational structure is fated to fail, or are 
there mechanisms that can be implemented to encourage and motivate elites to 
cooperate within the system? Consociationalism is the de facto “tool” used to help 
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re-shape divided societies, which Roeder and Rothchild argue is cause for many 
of the political problems we see in many present-day consociational democratic 
countries (Roeder, 5).  They argue that this is the case because consociationalism 
is designed and implemented in many circumstances without proper analysis of 
background circumstances or the composition, distribution, and interaction of the 
different ethnic groups (5).  Thus, Roeder and Rothchild argue that 
consociationalism is sometimes implemented in a society that is not properly 
suited for such a governmental structure, causing further exasperation of ethnic 
cleavages and political problems (6-7).  What sparked my interest after reviewing 
this piece was whether the cases of failed consociationalism are primarily due to 
the nature of the consociational agreement or rather the unwillingness of elites to 
cooperate and compromise.  If the nature of the agreement spurs the 
unwillingness of the elite to cooperate, then changes must be made in the 
agreement in order to incentivize cooperation among the different ethnic groups.  
If the unwillingness of the elites was present before the agreement was created, 
then also, modifications to the agreement must be made to incentivize ethnic elite 
cooperation.  Even though there are many external factors, which do not allow for 
a direct causal relationship between the aforementioned variables, that play a role 
in this question, it nonetheless helped to narrow my focus and allow me to 
construct my hypothesis, as I show below. 
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Discussion of Hypothesis 
As is somewhat demonstrated in Binningsbø’s piece, consociationalism 
has different effects on post-conflict societies when not treated as a monolithic 
structure: the varying presences of the four institutions that compose a 
consociational democracy (as outlined by Lijphart) had starkly different effects on 
post-conflict stability (in terms of the absence of violence) (Binningsbø, 23).  
Though Binningsbø’s dependent variable was the presence of post-conflict 
outbreak of violence, and thus her measure of post-conflict stability, I believe the 
same logic can be used and applied to show how variations in consociationalism 
affect the efficiency of a post-conflict governmental structure.  I will investigate 
how the type of a post-conflict consociational structure affects the efficiency of 
the government, one measure of which is ethnic elite cooperation.  To narrow my 
independent variable, my “variation” in consociational agreements will be limited 
to variations in the rigidity of these agreements.  I define rigidity as the level of 
formalization of a consociational agreement—whether or not the consociational 
agreement is formally institutionalized in a written agreement, such as in the 
Dayton Peace Accords/Constitution in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or informally 
adopted, such as in the 1943 National Pact of Lebanon.3  More specifically, I plan 
to investigate variations in the rigidity of minority vetoes between my two case 
studies. They are formally (e.g. written) allocated to the minority groups in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and informally (e.g. understood, similar veto-like system 
                                                            
3
 I will not be focusing on the 1943 National Pact specifically.  This reference was for definitional 
purposes. 
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present due to strict ethnoreligious quotas) allocated to the minority groups in 
Lebanon.  Thus, my hypothesis is that the more a minority veto is formally 
institutionalized in a post-war deeply-divided society, the more difficult it will be 
for ethnoreligious parties to cooperate.   
Explanation of Independent Variable 
I have decided to use the minority veto’s, a type of power sharing 
mechanism, level of formality as my independent variable because of the 
following variations in my selected cases. In comparison to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
who has clear veto powers for the three ethnic groups in both the executive and 
legislative branches (to use to protect each community’s (vital) interests), there is 
no institutionalized “veto power” in Lebanon, other than that allocated to the 
President in the Lebanese Constitution, to use over any legislation approved by 
the parliament.  As Shehadi and Mills describe in their chapter about Lebanon’s 
implementation of consociationalism, “the ‘mutual veto rule’ appears to be 
operative in a practical if not strictly legal way, given the distribution of high 
offices among the major sects” (Shehadi and Mills, 227).  Thus, the division of 
parliamentary seats and the troika act in a sense as the “mutual veto”, particularly 
between the Sunni and Christians.  However, other smaller minorities, such as the 
Druze and Shi’a, have less representation in government and public 
administration, and thus less prescribed leverage than that allocated to the Sunni 
and Christians.  This is partly the reason why Hezbollah requested to have veto 
power as it rose to power after 2005 (and which was granted to it May 21, 2008) 
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(Bloomberg Article).  Thus, the conflict that arose internally in Lebanon about 
factualizing and legalizing minority vetoes during this time is not a surprise since 
the Christians and Sunnis have in the past used the ambiguity of veto rights to 
their advantage, without addressing the need to ensure and allocate such rights to 
the Druze and the growingly influential Shi’a. 
Thus, I will investigate how the difference in the minority veto’s formality 
in both countries has affected elite cooperation, where Lebanon represents an 
example of an informal minority veto and Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a 
formal minority veto.  Arguably, since there has been no explicit minority veto in 
Lebanon, we have seen the creation of cross-confessional alliances, when both of 
the minority groups share the same grievances or interests.  These alliances shift 
with different interests and over time, and thus allow for greater variation in the 
makeup of these cross-confessional alliances.  Thus, my independent variable is 
the formality of the veto rights allocated to the “major” ethnic groups (obviously 
not all minorities have veto rights, smaller minority groups are present in both 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon, such as the Jewish and Druze communities 
respectively) and how that affects inter-ethnic political party cooperation (my 
dependent variable). 
Operationalization of Dependent Variable 
I believe investigating the level of ethnoreligious elite cooperation is a 
useful measure of the efficiency of a consociational regime.  Consociational 
governments place a large emphasis on the allocation and division of power 
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between their different minority groups. Without cross-ethnoreligious elite party 
cooperation, it will be difficult to get both consensuses and laws passed, since no 
one group should theoretically have enough power to hold a majority and thus 
consistently pass laws without the cooperation, and approval, from at least one 
other ethnoreligious group.  Thus, less cooperation between political elites from 
the three primary ethnic groups can be indicative of a poorly functioning 
governmental system, specifically when such lack of cooperation hinders and 
affects the functioning of the government.  I will focus mostly on the process of 
shared governance in the legislative branch of both governments to measure 
levels of inter-ethnoreligious elite cooperation. 
I will analyze the legislative proceedings for a 13-month period, 13 years 
and 18 years after the implementation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon’s 
consociational agreements, respectively.  The most important reason for this 
selection is to allow for enough time to have passed since the initial heavy-handed 
international intervention both countries experienced after their respective wars to 
see more clearly how consociational mechanisms affected political elite 
cooperation.  Though both countries still have a large international presence to 
this day, and thus a variable that cannot be completely controlled for, I 
nonetheless believe that analyzing more recent laws will at least help to bring to 
light the waning power of international actors and provide a short enough time 
frame to see variations in both countries’ consociational democracy effectiveness.  
Thus, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, I will analyze laws from June 1, 2008 to June, 30, 
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2009.  For Lebanon, I will analyze laws from September 1, 2008 to September 30, 
2009. 
Sources of Data and Methods 
I will look specifically at laws that were passed and not passed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, while only analyzing laws passed in the case of Lebanon. I 
understand there will be both data and time limitations that will constrict me in 
conducting a holistic analysis of all the laws passed and not passed in both 
countries’ 13-month period: I do not have access to information about laws not 
passed in Lebanon, for example.  Nonetheless, I have created a coding scheme to 
analyze the controversy around a law, e.g. whether or not it falls into a 
controversial sector. Non-controversial laws, in theory, should not incite ethnic 
tensions, since they are for the betterment of the country as a whole.  Thus, they 
should not have enough grounds to spark the fear of marginalizing an ethnic 
group’s power or interests.  
Additionally, it will also be important to look at laws passed and not 
passed in theoretically controversial sectors, to see whether there is any sort of 
cooperation over time regarding these matters.  In fact, controversial-sector laws 
that are passed, may be more favorable to my argument: the fact that ethnic 
groups are willing to help pass a law that is beneficial to another ethnic group 
shows an attempt to alleviate ethnic cleavages in the political realm.  Though this 
may be an outlier scenario, it would nonetheless be interesting to see if it does 
exist in my two case studies.  A complete discussion about my theoretical 
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argument about the theoretical and literature behind picking these controversial 
law sectors, in addition to a detailed outline of my methodology, can be found in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
I plan to use both countries’ online parliamentary archives, in addition to 
the Office of the High Representatives Parliamentary Minutes for Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly.  I also have fieldnotes and interviews 
from my time spent in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Austria this past summer, 2009.  
Though these interviews mostly deal with subjective perceptions of the 
government’s efficiency there, I believe I will need to include at least a brief 
mention of how the constituents perceive their governments in both countries as a 
counterbalance to my objective research.  
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Chapter 2 
Discussion of Case Selection and Delving into the Importance of Minority 
Vetoes in Consociational Governments 
 
I considered many cases of consociational governments when I decided 
which countries to select, ranging from well-established examples of 
consociationalism (e.g. Austria and Belgium) to more recent consociational 
governments (e.g. Rwanda and Afghanistan).  Nonetheless, I chose Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Lebanon because both countries have had similar post-conflict 
circumstances that I can control for, allowing me to focus on the varying levels of 
rigidity in their respective power-sharing agreements.  Thus, by analyzing these 
two countries, I aim to not only highlight the similarities these two countries 
share, but also to use these similarities to strengthen my argument by controlling 
for a significant number of important variables.  The following are the controls 
that I will use in my theory and analysis. Both countries have: 1) experienced 
ethnic wars, 2) had large, undocumented (i.e. no post-war censuses) demographic 
shifts, 3) ethnoreligious quotas in their governments, in addition to having 
parliamentary seat reservations for the respective ethnoreligious groups, 4) an 
extremely decentralized governmental structure, 5) experienced heavy-handed 
international intervention (both internationally and regionally), and 6) the largest 
network of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their 
respective regions. 
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Control 1: Similarity in Ethnic War Outbreaks 
Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon have had ethnic wars among their 
chief communal groups that caused political intervention and penetration from 
neighboring countries, in addition to international actors establishing systems of 
semi-protectorates in their post-conflict eras—though varying in nature in both 
countries (Chandler and Zahar).  The dissolving of Yugoslavia and the subsequent 
power vacuum and power-grabbing that emerged among the national leaders of 
the break-away regions caught Bosnia-Herzegovina in the middle of the worst 
war to emerge in Europe since World War II.  There have been several different 
explanatory approaches regarding the reasons behind the outbreak of violence in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 (Burg and Shoup, 33).  The simplistic 
approach used by some scholars, journalists, policy-makers—those with no expert 
historical or cultural knowledge of the region—painted the violent outbreak of 
war as one that was primordial in nature and wrongly assumed that there was pre-
existing ancient hatred between the different countries which festered until its 
breakpoint in the 1990’s (Gagnon, 1).  Such commentary on the Yugoslav wars 
overlooked Yugoslavia’s post-World War II history of ethnoreligious stability and 
political consolidation.   
As quickly as the ethnic fighting broke out during World War II between 
the Croatian Ustaša and the Serbian Cetniks, the Communist Partisans were able 
to heal those cleavages with the same speed and consolidate the warring groups 
into the country that became a beacon of heterogeneity and ethnic inter-mixing.  
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Compared to the other communist states in the Soviet bloc at the time, the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia favored an untraditional approach to communist 
rule.  Topics such as the discussion of minority representation and recognition 
(e.g. regarding the Muslims in Bosnia) were a key component of the communist 
government’s strategy for regulating ethnicity (Burg and Shoup, 41).  
Communism in Yugoslavia became increasingly less centralized over time, 
eventually evolving into a system of loose federalism under Tito (44).  
Nonetheless, self-interested political elites in the 1990’s, who felt threatened and 
challenged by the collapse of communism and governmental transitions, used 
violence as a means to redirect  “the focus of politics towards a purported threat” 
(Gagnon, 8).  Thus, the root of the ethnic war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a 
manifestation of a pre-established bitter feud between the different ethnoreligious 
factions, but rather a mechanism used by the threatened elites at the time to secure 
their own positions, to reconceputalize the former Yugoslav countries, and to 
ascertain their envisioned status quo. 
For over three decades, Lebanon experienced a non-continuous civil war 
that officially ended in 1990 with the signing of the Ta’if Agreement.   
Nonetheless, there was a clear distinction between the different rounds of the civil 
war, with the largest escalations of sectarian fighting in Lebanon beginning in 
1958, 1975, and 1982.  Lebanon’s ethnic war, even though it lasted for a much 
more prolonged period than that of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s (1992 – 1995), still 
exemplifies the same underlying characteristic of the Yugoslav wars – the use 
violence as a tool to create a system favoring otherwise threatened political elites.  
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Nevertheless, just like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon was not a faltering state on 
the brink of collapse at the outbreak of its civil war.  Rather, Lebanon made great 
strides in its recent pre-civil war history to heal old tensions and embrace its 
ethnoreligious plurality.  Due to the official recognition of the necessity of shared 
governance in the country, the National Pact of 1943 named Lebanon “the 
Switzerland of the Middle East” (Safa, 24).  In fact, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, due to its tolerant and cooperative confessional government during this 
time period, Lijphart described Lebanon as being one of the models of successful 
consociationalism (Seaver, 248).  Yugoslavia during the Titoist period was 
similarly hailed by the West as the “shining star of Eastern Europe” because of its 
higher levels of travels to the West and its greater acceptance of Western values 
than other Eastern European governments at the time (Gagnon, 8).   
The initial outbreak of civil war in Lebanon in 1958 was due to a changing 
regional environment that both pressured and worried the political elites in power 
at that time. Rapid demographic changes in both the Christian and Muslim 
communities heightened political elites’ ambitions to keep the 1943-status quo in 
place, at the expense of addressing the changes happening within the country. 
This parallels my previous discussion regarding how surrounding 
circumstances—like communism’s loss of traction in the 1990’s—influenced 
nationalistic elites’ decision-making during the break-up of Yugoslavia.  More 
specifically, Winslow explains that the Suez Crisis of 1956, the implementation of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, and the formation of the United Arab of 
Republic in 1958 worked together to make the Chamoun administration in 
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Lebanon feel threatened both from internal and external pressures (Winslow, 
107). 
Control 2: Large, Undocumented Demographic Shifts 
Additionally, both countries have not had any recent censuses, particularly 
in the periods after their wars.  As my fieldnotes from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
describe, this is a political tool used by elites of the historical majority ethnic 
communities to deny the existence of demographic changes that they fear would 
strip their community of power.  The lack of an updated census in Lebanon acts as 
a source for disgruntlement by the perceived “new” majority ethnoreligious 
group, who would like more political recognition (Salamey and Payne, 455).  
Additionally, the lack of a recent census in Bosnia-Herzegovina undermines 
reporting and factualizing the effects of ethnic cleansing that took place during the 
war.  Still, despite not having national censuses to document the changes in each 
ethnic group’s population, there is no denying that large demographics shifts did 
occur in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon due to their wars.  The changes 
are largely due to war-related death and casualties and the mass fleeing of 
refugees out of both countries during and after their respective conflicts.  Again, 
even though Lebanon has gone for much longer than Bosnia-Herzegovina without 
an official census—the last government-conducted census in Lebanon was in 
1932 compared to 1991 in Bosnia-Herzegovina—both countries have the same 
underlying reasons as to why the political elites are not advocating for updated 
censuses. 
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According to the 1991 census, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a population of 
4.3 million, 41 percent of which was identified as Muslim, 31.4 percent as Serb, 
17.3 percent as Croat, and 7.6 percent as other (Walsh, 57).  However, rough 
surveys taken by the UNHCR and the Economic Institute in Sarajevo estimated 
that at the end of the conflict in 1995 the population of people living in Bosnia-
Herzgovina was reduced to 2.9 million people and that nearly 1.3 million people 
(about 28 percent) of the pre-war population were now living outside of the 
country as refugees (Prašo).  Though the overall population ratios remained nearly 
the same (44 percent Bosniak, 34 percent Serb, and 16 percent Croat), the 
dispersion of the different ethnic groups within the country was starkly altered.  
Notably, the creation of the predominantly-Serb Republika Srpska by the end of 
the war served as a grim reminder of the ethnic displacement and cleansing that 
took place in the once ethnoreligiously porous country.   
Due to exterior (i.e. displaced refugees from the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict) and interior forces (i.e. increasing emigration of its Christian 
community), Lebanon also experienced large alterations in its demographic 
makeup.  Unlike Bosnia-Herzegovina’s abrupt change in its ethnoreligious 
composition, the changes in Lebanon’s societial structure took place over a longer 
period of time and thus were a cause for rising tensions between the different 
ethnoreligious communities.  Both countries, though, have vulnerable 
ethnoreligious communities (the Croats in Herzegovina and the Christians in 
Lebanon) that fear an updated census will shed light on their post-war diminishing 
numbers—which are mostly due to the faster growth of other communities and 
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their own community’s emigration into other countries—and provide justification 
for their need to relinquish some of their now unproportional power.  Nonetheless, 
as I mentioned before, it will be difficult to ascertain the demographic shifts at the 
national level in both countries without a recent census. But with domestic 
government information about pre- and post-war demographics as well as 
information about refugee fluxes and information gathered from other scholars, I 
believe I can control for demographic changes in both countries as a part of my 
research analysis.   
Control 3: Ethnoreligious Quotas in Government and Parliamentary Seat 
Divisions 
 Another control is that both countries have quotas and parliamentary seat 
divisions for each ethnoreligious group.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are 15 
delegates (5 from each group) in the House of Peoples and 42 members in the 
House of Representatives with two-thirds from the Federation and one-third from 
the House of Representatives (Bosnian Constitution). Compared to the previously 
present 6:5 ratio between Christians and Muslims respectively, the Ta’if 
Agreement in Lebanon stipulated that parliamentary seats would be divided 50-50 
between Christians and Muslims (Lebanese Constitution).  Also, both Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Lebanon have a similar decentralized governmental structure.  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the entity division, there are cantonal, municipal, 
and local government divisions in the Federation.  Lebanon is divided into 
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governorates which are then divided into districts (the Beirut governorate is not 
subdivided into districts), which are in turn also divided into municipalities. 
Ethnoreligious identity plays a large role in both countries’ governments.  
The representation and distribution of the different ethnoreligious identities is 
present in every level of government in both countries – each level has at least 
some sort of requirement, if not specified quotas, regarding the distribution and 
allocation of representation for the different ethnoreligious groups.  Since my 
thesis focuses on the national level of government in both countries, I will spend 
time here discussing the role of ethnicity at that level. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
entities reinforce the post-war ethnoreligious distribution of the country.  The 
Federation is predominantly Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks while the Republika 
Srpska is predominantly Bosnian Serb.  Thus, the political parties that represent 
each entity, particularly in the National Parliament, also reflect the ethnoreligious 
constituency of their respective entity.  Similarly, the Lebanese national 
government reflects both geographic distributions of the different confessions, in 
addition to proportional representation based upon population (though as 
mentioned in the previous section, based upon the 1932 census). The executive 
troika, consisting of a Maronite Christian President, Sunni Prime Minister, and 
Shi’a Speaker of the House, is similar to the tri-ethnic presidency in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Additionally, the National Parliament’s seats reflect not only the 
populations of each community but also their location – each Lebanese 
governorate has a pre-defined number of representatives that must be elected from 
it, representing its ethnoreligious spread.   Finally, the dominant political parties 
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in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon are both nationalistically-based.  They 
represent the three largest ethnoreligious groups in each country and they, for the 
most, wield the greatest power and influence in the political arena. 
 It is important to note that even though both countries are consociational 
democracies, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a variant of a presidential democracy 
whereas Lebanon more closely resembles a parliamentary democracy.  The key 
difference is the executive branch’s role in the parliamentary and legislative 
process: the executive branch in Lebanon plays a greater and more involved role, 
when compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These intricacies will be discussed in 
further detail in each respective case study chapter.   Nonetheless, for the 
purposes of my research, I am looking at variations in the use of the minority veto 
in the national assemblies of both countries. Thus, I am more focused on the 
logistics of the parliamentary process itself, rather than its role in the whole 
government.   
Control 4: Heavy-Handed International Intervention and Large NGO Networks 
As mentioned before, both countries have experienced heavy-handed 
international intervention since the end of their wars. Regionally, the largest 
interveners in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s case are Serbia and Croatia.  In Lebanon, 
they are Syria, Israel, and the Palestinian territories.  Internationally, both 
countries have had strong UN systems in place (from peacekeeping missions to 
human and refugee assistance).  Both countries experienced fighting up until the 
creation of both internationally-brokered peace agreements.  Due to this large 
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international presence, both countries have the largest non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) networks in their respective regions. There are more than 
1,000 registered NGOs in Beirut alone (Lebanon APS, 18).  Thus, both countries 
have had a heightened and prolonged role of international and regional 
monitoring and influence than other post-conflict societies – i.e. shorter UN 
peacekeeping missions in Croatia, Cambodia, and Rwanda.  This arguably 
changes the dynamic and capacity of local institutions since there are international 
institutions working on the same issues. This in turn marginalizes the self-
sustainability of many of the local institutions.  The lack of coordination within 
the international community in both these countries further exasperates the 
development of local institutions because there is no definitive mandate or 
recommendation for improvement provided at all times.  Nonetheless, a 
difference exists between these two countries.  Bosnia-Herzegovina has an Office 
of a High Representative, in which the internationally-sponsored High 
Representative (nominated by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation 
Council and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council) wields significant 
power in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s government, including the ability to impose and 
reject laws.  Lebanon does not have such an explicit representation of the 
international community’s voice present in its government but nevertheless still 
shares the same consequences of such strong exterior power within its country.  
The Ta’if Accords’ enumeration of rights to Syria, in order to “monitor” the 
Lebanese government, created a similar political situation to that of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in which an exterior force (Syria) could intervene in the Lebanese 
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political system.  Thus, even though the role of foreign actors in Lebanon is more 
implicit than that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, foreign actors still play a large role in 
the functioning of both of these countries. 
Chapter Conclusions 
I hypothesize that more formal minority vetoes lead to less ethnic elite 
cooperation in post-war societies.  My case studies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Lebanon were selected based upon the aforementioned variables that I could 
control for.  Lebanon represents an example of a country with an informal 
minority veto as understood through the strict quotas placed on its government 
and administration.  Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country with a very rigid 
consociational structure represents a country with a formal minority veto.   
The next chapters will discuss the operationalization of my dependent 
variable.  By analyzing laws passed regarding sectors that are theoretically not 
subject to ethnic tensions, as well as laws that are in theory subject to such 
tensions, I plan to portray how elites cooperate in both contexts and more 
importantly how the rigidity of the minority veto plays into the passage of such 
laws.  Thus, my dependent variable, the cooperation of elites, is a subset indicator 
of the government’s efficiency at large.  After my research and analysis, I plan to 
also briefly discuss the implications of my theory in terms of other consociational 
societies since it is not possible to generalize my conclusions from only two case 
studies.   
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Chapter 3 
Empirical Analysis of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
 The legislative procedure in consociational democracies requires 
cooperation between the various ethnoreligious groups within them in order to 
function.  The institutional engineering and set-up of consociational legislatures 
aim to avoid “majority rules” that are associated with the traditional, majoritarian 
notion of democracy. The inclusivity of, and quotas for, the different minorities in 
the legislative branches of consociational democracies, in addition to the rules of 
procedures that usually call for a voting framework based upon plurality (of at 
least the major ethnoreligious groups), rather than majority of votes are but a few 
ways that consociational democracies differ in their approach to democracy.   
Nonetheless, as Samuel Barnes states, “[d]emocracy is an institutionalized 
process of decision making and societal learning, not a substantive formula for a 
regime” (Barnes, 89).  Thus, there is no one set definition of what a democracy 
can, or should, be.  Every country’s democratic regime should be tailored to 
match its social, economic, and cultural traditions, a lengthy and involved process 
that requires an in-depth understanding of the different roles these facets of 
society play.  Therefore, post-conflict agreements, e.g. consociational 
arrangements, are subjected to sacrificing lengthy analysis of a country’s 
multifaceted traditions for the sake of quickly ending its conflict.  Barnes makes 
an important conclusion about the importance of cultural assumptions in post-
conflict governance:  these cultural assumptions, specifically cultural identifiers 
(e.g. religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic class) are “better conceived of as biases 
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that elites can manipulate and exploit than as conditions that prescribe a particular 
pattern of behavior” (90).  In post-conflict settings, where the governmental 
structure is fairly new and not long established, this exploitation of societal 
identity is used to fulfill an individual’s or group’s goal even though such 
incentivized behavior may not be beneficial to the society as a whole.  Such 
rational political egoism may even jeopardize the functioning of the state, where 
incentivized political actors “…interpret the rules to meet their goals when they 
can” (92).  Thus, in order to establish a viable democratic system in post-conflict 
societies, institutions must play a role in dissuading political elites from pursuing 
their own interests and work within the realms the established institutions 
intended for shared governance.  Nevertheless, for my case studies of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Lebanon, both countries have yet to achieve this level of 
institutionalized governmental efficiency.  Thus, since ethnoreligious interests 
still play a prevailing role in both countries’ government, it is imperative to delve 
into the role that ethnic interests play in governance.   
Theoretical Argument About  the Relevance of Controversial and  Non-
Controversial Law Sectors in Consociational Democracies 
 To analyze the role of ethnic interests in post-conflict consociational 
governments, I have created a coding scheme that signifies whether a law falls 
into a controversial or non-controversial law sector.  My six controversial sectors, 
numbered cardinally, are:  
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1. Education 
2. Religion 
3. Identity Symbols 
4. Refugee and Asylum Seekers 
5. Territorial Distribution and Claims 
6. Ethnic Representation in Government 
These six law sectors were chosen due to the ethnoreligious connotations they 
carry in consociational societies, based upon both the theoretical arguments and 
research present in the literature on consociationalism.  Education can be a useful 
tool “to create harmony within a nation of divergent peoples” (UNICEF, 6).4  
Nonetheless, in post-conflict setting, ethnocide: 
[t]he process whereby a culturally distinct people loses its identity as a 
result of policies designed to erode its land and resource base, the use of 
its language, its own social and political institutions, as well as its 
traditions, art forms, religious practices and cultural values (Stavenhagen, 
1990) 
is a common fear of minorities, particularly in the event of a new post-conflict 
regime that must rebuild its educational system.  Additionally, the manipulation, 
distortion, or false creation of history is not an uncommon procedure that political 
elites force onto already ethnicized education (UNICEF, 12-13).  Even 
unintentional omissions or recreations of historical narratives can happen in both 
pre-set (e.g. curriculums) and spontaneous circumstances (e.g. during classroom 
education, by teachers).  Thus, the historical and political power education wields 
can make it a highly controversial sector, particularly in deeply-divided societies 
that do not have a nationally unified educational system and curriculum.  Laws 
that deal with education in such contexts need to find a common denominator so 
                                                            
4
 In this thesis, education here refers to pre-university education (i.e. primary and secondary 
education).   
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that all parties involved do not feel that their historical narrative, group, or 
identity is being marginalized or omitted.  This also applies to laws that deal with 
religion and symbols of identity (i.e. identification cards, voter registration cards, 
censuses etc. where religious denomination or ethnic background may be noted), 
though on a more direct level.  Laws that are relevant to either of these two 
sectors can reignite tensions related to the underlying, and for the most part, 
ingrained, norm of identifying citizens in consociational societies: through asking 
each citizen to identify themselves with a religion or ethnicity.  This forced 
identification in a sense evokes cries from non-nationalistic parties to create 
citizens of the “state,” whereas nationalistic parties prefer to see the continuation 
of such segmented identification within the state, since it ensures their survival.   
Territorial issues can spark controversy because of the sensitive nature of 
the population balance and dispersion in post-conflict societies.  The separation of 
different ethnoreligious groups into separate territorial units is proposed by 
Kaufmann as a way to alleviate the tensions in deeply-divided societies.  
Nonetheless, the notion of separating and “unmixing” these once-destabilized 
heterogeneous societies, even if enacted on a small scale (i.e. one city, one 
district, etc.), is one that can evoke strong reactions among political elites.  
Population and land transfers are by no means an easy or desirable way of dealing 
with the problems that arise within deeply-divided societies, nor are they proven 
to guarantee long-term stability and compromise.  A notable example of 
separation “gone awry” is the bloody partitioning process of Punjab and Bengal in 
British India during the late 1940’s (Bose, 178).  Finally, laws dealing with ethnic 
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representation in government can also stir up controversy due to their proposition 
to amend the crafted balance of minority representation in government.  Thus, any 
changes, even if necessary, such as reallocating seats due to population shifts, 
would create clear winners and losers.  Since my emphasis is on controversial 
laws, all laws that did not fall under the aforementioned controversial sectors 
were lump coded as (9), non-controversial.  Additionally, there was an unclear 
code (99) to be used for: a) laws whose controversiality could not be deciphered 
through analyzing just the title of the law and b) laws which spanned several 
groups and therefore could not be coded under just one sector.5 
Sources and Research Approaches  
This controversial/non-controversial coding scheme was used to code all 
the laws passed and not passed in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly 
between June 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009.  The sources for these laws were the 
official list of laws passed from the BiH Parliamentary Assembly website and 
from the Office of the High Representative’s Parliamentary Minutes.  The focus 
of my empirical research is on Bosnia-Herzegovina.  A similar empirical analysis 
of Lebanon’s parliamentary proceedings is not possible due to severe data 
limitations; there is no publicly available record of laws not passed or of party 
voting for the adoption and non-adoption of laws.  Nonetheless, I will employ a 
quasi-qualitative research methodology to analyze my Lebanese case by 
                                                            
5
 These laws are noted in the tables and counted in the population of laws, but not in the total of 
laws passed/not passed, to avoid wrongly skewing the data analysis. 
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analyzing the laws passed and combing my findings with literature and general 
observations made about the functioning of the Lebanese Parliamentary 
Assembly.  This tri-fold quasi-qualitative approach will help to flesh out the how 
Lebanon’s informal minority veto structure affects its legislative process and in 
particular, what law sectors are subject to frequent vetoing and non-adoption.   
The Parliamentary Process of BiH 
 The Parliamentary Assembly of BiH is bicameral, consisting of an upper 
house – the House of Peoples – and a lower house – House of Representatives.  
The House of Representatives has 42 members (2/3, 28 members, from the 
Federation, 1/3, 14 members, from the Republika Srpska) (Article III, Section 2, 
BiH Constitution).  Members of the House of Representatives are directly elected 
from their respective entities.  A majority from all the members in the House of 
Representatives suffices as a quorum (Article III, Section 2, BiH Constitution).  
The House of Peoples is smaller, and has an indirect election process for its 
members.  It is compromised of 15 members, again with 2/3 of its members from 
the Federation (5 Croats, 5 Bosniaks) and 1/3 of its members from the Republika 
Srpka (5 Serbs).  These delegates are selected by the respective national 
assemblies of each entity: the House of Peoples of the Federation elects the Croat 
and Bosniak delegates and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpka elects 
the Serb delegates (Article III, Section 2, BiH Constitution).  A quorum in the 
House of Peoples consists of nine members—however, it is only a quorum if there 
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are at least three members of each community present (Article 61, Rules of 
Procedure for the HoP). 
 Proposed laws are introduced in the House of Representatives where they 
must pass through a committee review and a first and second reading.  The House 
of Peoples has an equal process of law review.  Nonetheless, the House of Peoples 
has the final say on whether or not a law is to be adopted.  It is important to note 
that Houses are divided into entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska.  As 
will be discussed below, entity approval is weighed more heavily than majority 
approval – even with a majority of votes, if “[t]he majority of votes does not 
contain one-third of the votes of Delegates from the territory of each Entity,” the 
law cannot be adopted (Article 79 RoP of the HoR and Article 73, RoP of the 
HoP).  This lack of entity consensus acts as the veto mechanism for each entity. 
 In both Houses, laws can be rejected due to two conditions: 1) failure to 
reach a majority or 2) blockage due to the lack of one-third of the votes from each 
entity.  In other words, laws can be rejected due to “majority vetoing” or “entity 
vetoing” (Kunrath, 5).  Nevertheless, if entity vetoing is invoked for a proposed 
law, the law is not automatically rejected – “the Collegium shall, working as a 
commission, strive to reach an agreement within three days” (Article 80, RoP for 
the HoR and Article 74, RoP for the HoP).  During the stage of “harmonisation,” 
if the Collegium (consisting of the Chairman and the First and the Second Deputy 
Chairman of the House) reaches an agreement, the Delegates are informed, and 
the law is adopted (for that reading).  If the Collegium does not reach an 
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agreement, the proposed law is sent back to the floor for a second round of voting.  
This applies to both Houses, where “decisions shall be taken by a majority of 
those present and voting, provided that the dissenting votes do not include two-
thirds or more of the Delegates elected from either Entity” (Article 80, RoP for 
the HoR and Article 73, RoP for the HoP).  Even with this increased requirement 
for entity vetoing (2/3’s versus 1/3’s) in the second round of voting, during the 
13-month period from 2008 to 2009, most laws still reached the required number 
of votes to invoke an entity veto and were thus rejected.  During my time frame of 
analysis, of all the laws that made it to a second round of voting, 15 were rejected, 
whereas 1 was adopted in the House of Representatives.  In the House of Peoples, 
of the 5 laws that made it to the second round of voting, only 1 was adopted.   
 Though the legislative processes in both Houses are similar for the most 
part, there are nonetheless two major differences.  As Kunrath notes, the House of 
Representatives’ Rules of Procedure were amended in 2007 to improve the 
previous process of harmonisation (Kunrath, 6).  Before the amendments, even 
when the Collegium reached an agreement, it was still obligated to send the law 
back to the floor for a second round of votes, subjecting it to the possibility of 
being rejected by entity vetoing once more (6).  Though this part of the 
harmonisation process has been amended in the House of Representatives’ Rules 
of Procedure, the House of Peoples has not undergone a similar reform.  
Secondly, in the House of Peoples, there is the possibility for a law to be rejected 
by the invocation of a “vital interest veto.”  As defined in Article 161 of the Rules 
of Procedure of the House of Peoples, “[a] decision proposed by PABiH may be 
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declared detrimental to the vital interest of Bosniak, Croat, or Serb people by the 
majority by the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb members.”6  If such a veto is invoked, a 
joint committee, compromising three delegates (a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb, 
each one selected by the respective community’s Delegates) has five days to 
resolve the issue (Article 4, Section 3, BiH Constitution and Article 162, RoP for 
the HoP).  If the committee is unsuccessful in resolving the issue, the law in 
question is submitted to the Constitutional Court of BiH, to review whether the 
community group’s vital interest was in fact infringed upon (Article 192, RoP for 
the HoP).   
For the time frame of this study, no vital interest vetoes were invoked by 
the House of Peoples.  The lack of the use of vital interest vetoes in comparison to 
entity vetoing is understandable for several reasons.  First, the vital interest vetoes 
do not have the ability to thwart the passage of legislation, as entity vetoes do – if 
the Constitutional Court deems that the law does not threaten the interest of the 
community in question, then the law can still be adopted via the second round of 
voting.  Additionally, since there is no formal definition of what constitutes a 
community’s vital interest, the invokers of the vital interest veto are playing an 
uncertain game when they propose that a law threatens their interests.  Much 
room is left to the Constitutional Court to decide whether or not a law threatens 
the proposing group’s interest and thus the proposing group cannot be certain that 
they would win the case if the law makes it to the Constitutional Court.  Thus, as 
                                                            
6
 PABiH stands for the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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found in the comprehensive study on BiH’s parliamentary process from 1997-
2008 by Professor Kasim Trnka and as noted by Kunrath in her Council of Europe 
report, the vital interest veto has only been invoked four times in eleven years 
(Kurath, 7).   
It is interesting to mention that there have been several suggestions as to 
what sectors might be relevant to the invocation of a vital interest veto.  In the 
amendments to Article IV of the BiH Constitution, the following list was 
provided, to describe possible sectors that “may invoke” a vital interest veto: 
1. The rights of all three constituent peoples to be represented in legislative, 
executive, judicial authorities, and to have equal rights to be involved in 
decision-making processes; 
2. The identity of a constituent people; 
3. Territorial organization; 
4. Organization of the bodies of public authority; 
5. Education; 
6. Use of languages and scripts; 
7. National symbols and flags; 
8. Spiritual heritage, particularly the fostering and affirmation of religious 
and cultural identity and traditions; 
9. Preservation of the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
10. Public information systems; 
11. Amendments to BiH Constitution (Article IV amendments, Section 12, 
BiH Constitution). 
 
My controversial sectors – education, religion, identity symbols, territorial 
distribution and claims, and ethnic representation in government – are embodied 
in the suggested list of vital interest sectors.  My sector of refugee and asylum 
seekers, though it does not appear in the aforementioned list, can still be argued to 
be controversial in nature due the implication refugee returns carry for population 
distribution among the different ethnoreligious communities.  Sustainable refugee 
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returns, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is a means to try to “undo” the effects 
of ethnic cleansing perpetrated during the war (Eastmond, 142).  The topic of 
refugee return, though not as visible as it was in the years directly after the war 
(the initial wave of refugee return was between 1996 and 1999), is still cause for 
ethnic debate when mentioned (Tuathail, 10).  For example, a Proposed Revised 
Strategy for the implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Accords, 
rejected by an entity veto from the Republika Srpka in its second reading, was an 
attempt to discuss how to ensure the construction of housing units for returned 
refugees in order to help create more sustainable returns (52nd session, Item 15, 
OHR Parliamentary Minutes).  Annex VII was the provision in the Dayton Peace 
Accords that aimed to reverse “the demographic consequences of ethnic 
cleansing” (Tuathail, 8).  Nonetheless, its emphasis on freely allowing anyone to 
return to their home of origin, in addition to property compensation, evoked many 
difficulties in its implementation process, particularly in areas where an ethnic 
group was a majority before the war only to become a minority after the war (i.e. 
Zvornik (Bosniak returnees), Travnik (Croat returnees), and the Una-Sana region 
(Serb returnees) (11). 
Coding Process 
 My coding process consisted of going through all the parliamentary 
sessions of both Houses between June 1, 2008 and June 30, 2009: sessions 29 to 
55 for the House of Representatives and sessions 17 to 31 for the House of 
Peoples.  I only analyzed the actions taken for proposed and adopted laws in my 
coding analysis – my coding did not extend to the Houses’ conclusions on 
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appointments, resolutions, decisions, approvals for ratification, etc.  For each law, 
I coded it in terms of its controversial/non-controversial law sector, and marked 
whether it was adopted or rejected, and in which reading such a decision was 
made.  If a law was rejected, I noted whether it was due to majority vetoing or 
entity vetoing.  If entity vetoing was the reason a law was rejected, I noted which 
entity (the Federation or the Republika Srpska) invoked the veto.  If a law was 
adopted, I noted whether it was adopted under normal procedure or whether it was 
adopted after harmonisation or under urgent procedure.  If it was adopted under 
urgent procedure, I marked it as being adopted in the second reading, since it did 
not have to pass the normal process of two readings.   
 For the purposes of this more recent study, I used the parliamentary 
minute summaries as provided by the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  
The official parliamentary minutes, as available on the BiH Parliamentary 
Assembly (PA) website, only cover the parliamentary sessions held between 1996 
and 2006.  Thus, it would not be possible to use the official parliamentary minutes 
for this study.  Though the information was not always complete in the OHR 
parliamentary minutes, particularly regarding voting distribution, e.g. the number 
of votes in favor, against, and abstained for a law, and party voting,  the official 
parliamentary minutes on the PA website also did not follow a consistent pattern 
of voting summarization.  Nonetheless, there was a fair amount of reported votes 
to conduct some analysis of voting distribution.  If reported, I noted all the votes 
in favor, against, and abstained for each law, in addition to the political parties 
and their respective voting on a particular law.  Concerning entity vetoing, I noted 
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the number of votes, either for or against a law, from both the Federation and the 
Republika Srpska and the political parties involved in such voting, when reported.  
Additionally, if a second round of votes was undertaken for a law, I similarly 
gathered all the available voting information.  I took note of all the available 
voting information for both laws adopted and rejected in each House.   
 It is important to note though that I analyzed every instance of voting on 
proposed laws.  I analyzed  laws in each reading level and at all stages of 
consideration, which is particularly relevant to laws that were subject to rejection, 
since there are several tiers of consideration that are only applicable to rejected 
laws.  Thus, I analyzed laws that were rejected, rejected and sent back to the 
committees, rejected and harmonized, and rejected and not harmonized.  I make 
this distinction clear to bring awareness to the fact that my study strives to show 
the mechanics of inter-ethnic interactions in the BiH PA, rather than just relaying 
how many laws are passed/not passed, and not considering laws that were sent 
back to the committee.  If I had done the latter, I would have only analyzed 
“truly” rejected laws, since laws that are sent back to the committee for additional 
review are not actually rejected—they can be salvaged in the committee review.  
Nonetheless, disregarding laws sent back to the committee would also mean that I 
would have overlooked the voting processes that are involved in more thorough 
law reviews.  By analyzing the intricacies of the voting process in the PA, I plan 
to shed more light on role of ethnic voting as a law passes, or does not pass, 
through the various levels of consideration in both Houses.  This allows me to 
follow inter-ethnic cooperation, or lack thereof, as it unfolds across different parts 
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of the voting process.  Though I do make note of the finalized number of laws 
adopted and not adopted, this study is an overall analysis of all voting instances 
on draft laws in this 13-month period of investigation.   
Findings 
 My findings aim to discover to what extent ethnic vetoing, e.g. vital 
interest vetoes or entity vetoing, is used in controversial sectors, in comparison to 
non-controversial sectors.  Theoretically, we should see ethnic voting being used 
far more in controversial versus non-controversial sectors, for the reasons 
discussed in this chapter’s theory section.  To test such a hypothesis, the 
following crosstabulations were made: 
Table 1: Laws Rejected in Different Readings in the Bicameral 
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH takes a look at the number of laws rejected by 
sector in both the first and second readings in both Houses, and notes whether a 
law was rejected due to majority or entity vetoing. 
Table 2: Laws Adopted and Laws Not Adopted in the Bicameral 
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH notes the overall number of laws adopted and 
not adopted in each law sector in both Houses. 
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Tables 3 and 4: Party Voting on Laws Not Adopted show the number of laws, 
sub-divided by sector, each political party voted for, against, or abstained from in 
each House respectively.7 
Tables 5 and 6: Actions to Laws in First Reading show the number of laws in 
each law sector in the first reading that were adopted, rejected by ethnic voting, 
and rejected by majority vetoing in each House, respectively. 
 Tables 7 and 8: Actions to Laws in Second Reading show the number of laws 
in each law sector  in the second reading that were adopted, rejected by ethnic 
voting, and rejected by majority vetoing in each House, respectively. 
Tables 9 and 10:  Percent Voting Distribution on Laws Adopted in First 
Reading show the average margin of votes that laws in each sector were adopted 
by in the first reading of both Houses, respectively. 
Tables 11 and 12:  Percent Voting Distribution on Laws Adopted in Second 
Reading show the average margin of votes that laws in each sector were adopted 
by in the first second of both Houses, respectively. 
  
                                                            
7
 See Annex I for information about political party distribution in the House of Representatives in 
addition to the definition of acronyms of the various political parties. 
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Table 1: Laws Rejected in Different Readings in the Bicameral 
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH8 
June 1, 2008 – June 30, 2009 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
 
House of Representatives (Lower House) 
n = 48 
House of Peoples (Upper House) 
n = 16 
Law Sector 
 
n = 64 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
by EV in 
HoR 
 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
by MV in 
HoR 
 
Rejected 
in 2nd  
Reading 
by EV  in 
HoR 
 
Rejected 
in 2nd 
Reading 
by MV in 
HoR 
 
Rejected 
in 1st  
Reading 
by EV in 
HoP 
 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
by MV in 
HoP 
 
Rejected 
in 2nd 
Reading 
by EV in 
HoP 
 
Rejected 
in 2nd 
Reading 
by MV in 
HoP 
 
Controversial 3 1 4 1   1  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
1 1 1    1  
 
Territorial 
Issues 
  1      
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
2  2 1     
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
16 4 11 7 8 3 2 1 
Unclear   1    1  
TOTAL  
(Shaded Rows) 
19 5 15 8 8 3 3 1 
Table 1 is an overview of all the laws rejected in both Houses during this 
time frame of analysis. Contrary to my hypothesis, most of the laws rejected by 
entity vetoing were in non-controversial sectors, rather than controversial sectors.  
14.9% of the total rejected laws in the House of Representatives were rejected due 
to entity vetoing in controversial sectors, compared to 6.7% of the total rejected 
laws in the House of Peoples.  Regarding laws rejected by entity vetoing in non-
controversial sectors, 57.4% of the total laws were rejected in the House of 
Representatives compared to 66.7% of the totals laws rejected in the House of 
Peoples.  Even though more non-controversial laws were blocked by entity 
vetoing, this does not necessarily mean ethnic interests and controversy were not 
                                                            
8
 Abbreviations used in tables from here on out: HoR – House of Representatives; HoP – House of 
Peoples; EV – Entity vetoing; and MV – Majority vetoing. 
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in play.  My coding merely encompassed whether a law belonged to one of my 
controversial sectors.  However, a law that deals with a theoretically non-
controversial sector can still be subjected to ethnic controversy in practice.  My 
results suggest that all sectors – non-controversial and controversial – can become 
contentious for ethnic groups.  Laws, such as the Proposed Law on the Control of 
Foreign Trade Traffic of Good and Services of Strategic Importance for Safety of 
BiH, despite not dealing with a controversial topic, can still invoke some sort of 
infringement on a community’s interest, e.g. allowing one group to profit more 
than the rest, such that an entity veto is used.9  Access to the laws in their entirety 
and complete parliamentary assembly discussions would be necessary for this 
type of in-depth qualitative analysis.  Nevertheless, through the use of my more 
quantitative approach -- looking at the overall pattern regarding the use of entity 
and majority vetoing in different sectors – in conjunction with the 
acknowledgement of the aforementioned point, there is still much information to 
be learned about the parliamentary assembly process. 
It is clear the issue of ethnic representation in government evoked the most 
instances of entity vetoing, particularly in the House of Representatives, such that 
these laws did not have the opportunity to make it to the House of Peoples to be 
considered for adoption.   This does not come as too much of a surprise since such 
laws aimed to change the fragilely kept status quo of ethnic representation in 
government.  For example, the Proposed Law on Amendments to the Law on 
                                                            
9
 This draft law was rejected by a RS entity vote in the second reading in the House of 
Representatives.  See Item 8, 55th session, OHR Parliamentary Minutes. 
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Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of BiH was overwhelmingly 
rejected in the second reading in the House of Representatives – only one vote 
was  in favor, whereas  26 votes were against it (6 abstained) (Item 8, Session 33, 
OHR Parliamentary Minutes).  Though this is an example of majority vetoing, it 
nonetheless highlights how sensitive a topic re-analyzing governmental structure 
can be.10   
Table 2: Laws Adopted and Laws Not Adopted in the Bicameral 
Parliamentary Assembly of BiH 
June 1, 2008 – June 30, 2009 
Sources: Official Gazette and OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
Law Sector 
n = 116 
 
Laws 
Adopted 
n = 52 
 
% of 
Laws 
Adopted 
Laws Not Adopted 
n = 64 
Due 
to 
MV 
% Not 
Adopted, 
MV 
Due 
to 
EV 
% Not 
Adopted, 
EV 
Controversial 8 17.0% 2 11.8% 8 17.8% 
 
Education 3  0  0  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
1  1  3  
 
Territorial 
Issues 
1  0  1  
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
3  1  4  
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
39 83.0% 15 88.2% 37 82.2% 
Unclear 5  0  2  
TOTAL 
(Shaded 
Rows) 
47 100% 17 100% 45 100% 
 
                                                            
10
 An example of entity vetoing is the Proposed Law on Ensuring of Proportional Ethnic 
Representation in Bodies of Administration and Local Self-Governance in BiH, which was 
rejected in its first reading by a RS entity vote in the 52nd session of the House of Representatives.  
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Combining all the laws subject to rejection in both Houses, 72.3% of the 
laws rejected were due to entity vetoing – by and large, entity vetoing is the most 
prominent way of rejecting a law.  However, to look at the bigger picture, more 
than half, 56.9%, of all laws proposed were rejected (by either entity or majority 
vetoing).  This percentage is not of laws rejected in their final state (e.g. in the 
second reading), but rather of all laws that are rejected at any review stage.  
Though a law may be listed “twice,” for example if it was rejected in both the first 
and second reading (only possible if it was harmonized after the first reading), I 
treat them as unique due to the fact that rarely is a law in identical form if it was 
subject to multiple rejections – amendments must be added in order to alleviate 
the conflict that aroused the law’s rejection.  However, the same approach was not 
applied to laws passed.  The laws adopted in the table above are the final versions 
of laws, as published in the Official Gazette of BiH.  The reason I use the 
finalized number of laws adopted is that it is possible to double-count laws 
adopted.  A law that passes in the first and second reading in both of the Houses 
with no rejections and therefore with no amendments, would be identical in text in 
all four voting instances and thus would be wrongly counted as four separate 
laws, when in fact it is the same law.  Keeping this discussion of methodology in 
mind, only 40.5% of laws proposed were adopted in this 13 month period. 
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Table 3: Party Voting on Laws Not Adopted in the House of Representatives 
of BiH11 
June 1, 2008 – June 30, 2009 
Sources: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the rejected laws in the House of Representatives, 60% had reported 
“votes against” by specific parties, and only 22% had reported “votes abstained.”  
Thus, even though it is not possible to make a generalizable statement about party 
voting based upon this limited data, the trend seen in this selected sample 
nonetheless matches up with the overall trend seen in the House of 
Representatives.  The four dominant parties that voted against laws were, in 
                                                            
11
 n = 54 rejected with reported voting, not all include party voting, see relevant n’s. 
Political 
Party 
Number of 
Laws Against 
N = 32 
Number of Laws 
Abstained From 
N = 12 
SDP 6 7 
HDZ 7 1 
HDZ-1990 5 3 
BPS 2 4 
NSRzB 3  
DNZ 2 2 
SNSD 33 3 
SDS 23 5 
PDP 21 2 
DNS 10 4 
SDA 7  
SBiH 6  
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decreasing: SNSD, SDS, PDP, and DNS.12  These four parties are the Republika 
Srpska-specific parties and are thus involved in the majority of the entity veto 
invocations in the House of Representatives.  Of the 19 times the entity veto was 
invoked in the first reading of the House of Representatives, 17 of those vetoes 
were invoked by the Entity of the Republika Srpska.  In addition, all 16 of the 
entity vetoes in the second reading were invoked by the Republika Srpska.  Thus, 
the reported information on party voting is not sufficient to make a claim on 
parties and their voting habits, the combination of the available data on voting and 
the complete information on entity vetoing, provides sufficient evidence to 
ascertain that the four political parties of the Republika Srpska are the most 
involved in voting against laws.  As will be discussed in depth in my conclusions 
chapter, the Republika Srpska has incentives to use entity vetoing (and vital 
interest vetoes in the House of Peoples), to help achieve its goal of strengthening 
its entity at the expense of weakening the national government. 
Nonetheless, it is important to make a point that is otherwise not realized 
through the data.  As Kunrath points out, since the Federation has 28 members in 
the House of Representatives, compared to only 14 members from the Republika 
Srpska, entity vetoing in the Federation could be overshadowed by the fact that it 
would also register as majority vetoing (e.g. failure of enough members voting for 
a law from the Federation such that a majority in the House as whole could not be 
reached) (Kunrath, 10).  Thus, in both Kunrath’s study and mine, Federation 
entity vetoes were only counted as such if there were explicitly mentioned.  
                                                            
12
 See Annex I for the full names of political parties. 
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However, for the most part, from the discussions in the OHR parliamentary 
minute records, it seems that when laws were rejected due to a majority vote, they 
were rejected due to a lack of consensus in general rather than just within the 
Federation.  Nonetheless, such observations cannot be made into casual claims 
without sufficient evidence and therefore it is important to note where the data 
may deviate from the reality.   
Table 4: Party Voting on Laws Not Adopted in the House of Peoples 
of BiH13 
June 1, 2008 – June 30, 2009 
Sources: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
Political 
Party 
Number of 
Laws Against 
N = 6 
Number of Laws 
Abstained From 
N = 5 
SDP  1 
HDZ-1990  1 
SNSD 7  
SDS 3 2 
PDP 3 4 
SDA 1  
SBiH  1 
Of the rejected laws in the House of Peoples, 38% had reported “votes 
against” by specific parties, and only 31% had reported “votes abstained.”  
Similar to what we saw in the House of Representatives, three of the four 
Republika Srpska parties (SNSD, SDS, PDP) were the parties with the largest 
                                                            
13
 n = 16 rejected with reported voting, not all include party voting, see relevant n’s 
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reporting of “votes against.”  Nonetheless, there was much less party voting 
reported in the House of Representatives, particularly in terms of “votes against.”  
However, taking a similar look at the invocation of entity vetoes, of the 8 entity 
vetoes in the first reading in the House of Peoples, all were issued by the 
Republika Srpska.  Similarly, the Republika Srpska invoked all 4 entity vetoes in 
the second reading. 
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Table 5:  Actions to Laws in First Reading in House of Representatives 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
Law Sector 
n = 75 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 1st 
Reading 
% Laws 
Adopted 
Laws Rejected 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
due to 
MV 
% Laws 
Rejected, 
due to 
MV 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
due to 
EV 
% Laws 
Rejected, 
due to 
EV 
Controversial 4 10.5% 2 11.8% 3 15.8% 
 
Education 1  0  0  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
0  1  1  
 
Territorial 
Issues 
1  0  0  
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
2  1  2  
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
34 89.5% 15 88.2% 16 84.2% 
Unclear 1  0  0  
TOTAL (Shaded 
Rows) 
38 100% 17 100% 19 100% 
 
 
 Of the 75 laws reviewed in the first reading of the House of 
Representatives, 36 were rejected and 38 were adopted.  A little more than half 
(52%) of the laws rejected were due to entity vetoing.  Again, we see more non-
controversial laws being both adopted and passed.  Nonetheless, out of the 9 
controversial laws, 5 were rejected, 3 of which were due to entity vetoing. 
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Table 6:  Actions to Laws in First Reading in House of Peoples 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
Law Sector 
n = 51 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 1st 
Reading 
% Laws 
Adopted 
Laws Rejected 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
due to 
MV 
% Laws 
Rejected, 
due to 
MV  
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 1st 
Reading 
due to 
EV 
% Laws 
Rejected 
due to 
EV 
Controversial 11 28.2% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
Education 2  0  0  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
3  0  0  
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
6  0  0  
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
28 71.8% 3 100% 8 100% 
Unclear 1  0  0  
TOTAL (Shaded 
Rows) 
39 100% 3 100% 8 100% 
 
 On the other hand, there were no controversial laws rejected in the first 
reading of the House of Peoples. Overwhelmingly, most of the laws were 
adopted: 76% of the total laws in the first reading were adopted.  Contrary to my 
expectations, there was a significant proportion of non-controversial laws 
rejected.  11 laws out of 50 proposed laws (8 due to entity vetoing) were rejected 
in the first reading of the House of Peoples.  Comparing to the 23% of non-
controversial laws rejected in the first reading of the House of Representatives, 
21% percent of the non-controversial laws were rejected in the House of Peoples.  
Even being theoretically non-controversial in nature, and passing through two 
readings in the House of Representatives (if not more, e.g. harmonisation), a 
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significant number of laws still managed to be rejected in the first reading of the 
House of Peoples. 
Table 7:  Actions to Laws in Second Reading in House of Representatives 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
Law Sector 
n = 60 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 2nd  
Reading 
% Laws 
Adopted 
Laws Rejected 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 2nd  
Reading 
due to 
MV 
% Laws 
Rejected, 
due to 
MV 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 2nd  
Reading 
due to 
EV 
% Laws 
Rejected, 
due to 
EV 
Controversial 6 16.7% 1 12.5% 4 26.7% 
 
Education 2  0  0  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
2  0  1  
 
Territorial 
Issues 
1  0  1  
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
1  1  2  
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
30 83.3% 7 87.5% 11 73.3% 
Unclear 0  0  1  
TOTAL 
(Shaded 
Rows) 
36 100% 8 100% 15 100% 
The second reading in the House of Representatives saw a significant 
decrease in the percentage of laws rejected, from the total proposed, in 
comparison to the first reading: from 52% to 38%.  Contrary to my expectation, 
there was an increase in the number of controversial laws passed, from 4 to 6 
between the two readings.  In similar terms, using the percentage from the total 
laws in each reading, there was an increase from 10.5% to 16.7%.  However, the 
use of the entity veto still remains the predominant method of rejecting a law for 
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both controversial and non-controversial sectors.  Even between the first and 
seconding reading, 15 out of 60 total laws were blocked due to an entity veto. 
Table 8:  Actions to Laws in Second Reading in House of Peoples 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
Law Sector 
n = 63 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 2nd  
Reading 
% Laws 
Adopted  
Laws Rejected 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 2nd  
Reading 
due to 
MV 
% 
Rejected, 
due to 
MV 
Number 
of Laws 
Rejected 
in 2nd  
Reading 
due to 
EV 
% 
Rejected, 
due to 
EV 
Controversial 11  0 0% 1 33.3% 
 
Education 4  0  0  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
3  0  1  
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
4  0  0  
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
45  1 100% 2 66.7% 
Unclear 2  0  1  
TOTAL (Shaded 
Rows) 
56  1 100% 3 100% 
 
 This is the final graph in showing the succession of a law’s passage 
through both Houses.  Overwhelming, all the laws that reach this stage are 
adopted.  Similarly to Kunrath’s findings, it is peculiar to see one controversial 
and two non-controversial laws rejected by entity vetoing at this stage – it begs 
the question why, after passing through 3 readings (with the possibility of more if 
harmonisation occurred), laws can still be rejected via an entity veto.  
Nonetheless, it is also important to note the increase in the number of 
controversial laws passed – particularly in the realms of identity/symbology and 
ethnic representation in government.   
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Table 9:  Percent Voting Distribution on Laws Adopted in First Reading in 
House of Representatives 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
Law Sector 
n = 50 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 1st   
Reading 
Average % 
of Votes in 
Favor 
(Votes in 
Favor/Total 
Votes) 
Average % 
of Votes 
Against 
(Votes 
Against/Total 
Votes) 
Average % of 
Abstained 
Votes (Votes 
Abstained/Total 
Votes) 
Controversial 11  
 
Education 1 91.67% 5.56% 9.43% 
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
3 89.93% 0.85% 9.22% 
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
38 88.00% 5.76% 9.43% 
Unclear 1 64.10% 2.56% 33.33% 
TOTAL 
(Shaded 
Rows) 
49  
 It is important to note the percent margins of the votes in favor, against, 
and abstained for an adopted law in order to relay how popular an adopted law 
was.  In particular, by looking at the average of votes in favor (averaging all the 
votes in favor divided by total votes for each law) for each sector, it sheds lights 
on the support for the laws in each controversial sector. Many laws were passed 
unanimously, and thus were recorded as 100% votes in favor.  Therefore, even if 
there were laws that were passed with smaller percentiles overall, if there were 
more unanimously adopted laws in that sector, the variations would be smoothed 
out. As will be seen in the coming cross-tabulations, more laws were passed in the 
House of Peoples unanimously, when compared to the House of Representatives.  
More in-depth discussions follows, but a difference in the number of members 
and voting structure in both Houses plays a role in accounting for this voting 
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percentage difference.  Nevertheless, in the first reading of the House of 
Representatives, laws regarding ethnic representation in government were passed 
with a smaller percentage approval than those of education, though not by much. 
Table 10:  Percent Voting Distribution on Laws Adopted in Second Reading 
in House of Representatives 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
Law Sector 
n = 37 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 2nd    
Reading 
Average % 
of Votes in 
Favor 
(Votes in 
Favor/Total 
Votes) 
Average % 
of Votes 
Against 
(Votes 
Against/Total 
Votes) 
Average % of 
Abstained 
Votes (Votes 
Abstained/Total 
Votes) 
Controversial 10  
 
Education 3 87.71% 6.25% 6.04% 
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
4 94.59% 0.68% 4.73% 
 
Refugee/ 
Asylum 
Seekers 
1 97.50% 0% 7.69% 
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
2 92.31% 1.28% 6.41% 
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
26 76.92% 23.08% 2.50% 
Unclear 1 64.10% 2.56% 33.33% 
TOTAL 
(Shaded 
Rows) 
36  
 We see the opposite happen in the second reading of the House of 
Representatives, where education-related laws see a decrease in their votes-in-
favor percent margin when compared to ethnic representation in government 
laws, which actually increase in support.  This could be to due to two reasons.  
The ethnic representation in government law sector may have seen more laws 
adopted under urgent procedure (which are coded as laws in their second 
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reading).  Many, if not most, of the laws adopted under urgent procedure are done 
so unanimously.  Thus, more laws adopted unanimously would inflate the 
percentage of votes-in-favor.  Additionally, education may have seen more laws 
that were adopted after harmonisation, meaning these were previously laws that 
were rejected and had a significant amount of discontent.  Even if they are 
adopted in their harmonisation process, the percentage margins in favor of the law 
would not, for the most part, be unanimous and thus would not be subjected to 
inflation. 
Table 11:  Percent Voting Distribution on Laws Adopted in First Reading in 
House of Peoples 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
Law Sector 
n = 42 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 2nd    
Reading 
Average % 
of Votes in 
Favor 
(Votes in 
Favor/Total 
Votes) 
Average % 
of Votes 
Against 
(Votes 
Against/Total 
Votes) 
Average % of 
Abstained 
Votes (Votes 
Abstained/Total 
Votes) 
Controversial 8  
 
Education 2 90.91% 9.09% 0% 
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
3 100.0% 0% 0% 
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
3 100.0% 0% 0% 
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
33 94.91% 15.27% 3.38% 
Unclear 1 100.0% 0% 0% 
TOTAL 
(Shaded 
Rows) 
41  
Laws adopted in the House of Peoples are for the most part unanimously 
adopted.  The same argument can be used here to explain this rise of unanimity: 
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laws have already been through two readings, two screenings in a sense, in the 
House of Representatives.  Additionally, with fewer members in the House of 
Peoples (15 compared to 84), there is more of an emphasis either to work together 
or against each other.  The quorum consisting of 9 people, 3 from each 
community, makes it difficult enough to ensure adequate representation for 
parliamentary meetings, let alone a majority in favor of a law.  If the quorum was 
never met, laws would never be passed through the House of Peoples (i.e. an 
ethnic group simply failing to show up for a parliamentary session).  Nonetheless, 
when these difficulties are put aside and the different groups aim to work 
together, I believe the smaller nature of the House of Peoples, in addition to the 
filtering of laws from the House of Representatives, helps explain the more 
unanimous passage of laws in the upper House.  
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Table 12:  Percent Voting Distribution on Laws Adopted in Second Reading 
in House of Peoples 
Source: OHR Parliamentary Minutes 
 
Law Sector 
n = 63 
 
Number 
of Laws 
Adopted 
in 2nd    
Reading 
Average % 
of Votes in 
Favor 
(Votes in 
Favor/Total 
Votes) 
Average % 
of Votes 
Against 
(Votes 
Against/Total 
Votes) 
Average % of 
Abstained 
Votes (Votes 
Abstained/Total 
Votes) 
Controversial 14  
 
Education 4 96.43% 0% 0% 
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
4 100% 0% 0% 
 
Refugee/ 
Asylum 
Seekers 
1 100% 0% 0% 
 
Ethnic 
Representation 
in Government 
5 98.67% 0.00% 6.67% 
Non-
Controversial/ 
Other 
48 94.79% 7.83% 4.09% 
Unclear 1 61.54% 23.08% 15.38% 
TOTAL 
(Shaded 
Rows) 
62  
 
 The second reading of the House of Peoples also had most of the 
controversial laws passed with near unanimity.  The increase in the percentage for 
education laws and the decrease in the percentage for ethnic representation in 
government are another example of the same argument discussed about the shift 
in percentages seen in the second reading of the House of Representatives. 
Conclusions for Chapter 
 My analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s parliamentary process between June 
2008 and June 2009 sheds some light on shared governance in its national 
parliament.  First, contrary to my expectations, the fact that there were more bills 
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rejected in non-controversial law sectors than in controversial law sectors 
suggests that all sectors are subjected to ethnic controversy.  The nature of the bill 
is not enough to predict whether or not it will be controversial.  Rather, 
controversy more often arises due to the implications ethnic groups believe will 
result from contested bills, particularly if they believe their group will somehow 
be marginalized, or if there is a discrepancy in the allocation of power and 
administration between the different groups in the implementation of a proposed 
law.  My second conclusion is that the lengthy process of several readings in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly allows for multiple and ample 
opportunities for the ethnic groups to use their entity, or vital interest, veto to 
block a law.  Thus, the difficulty for a law to pass through at least 4 readings, 
without any sort of ethnic group contestation, can help explain why we do not see 
more laws being passed by the Parliamentary Assembly. Finally, the fact that the 
House of Peoples is smaller than the House of Representatives, in addition to the 
fact that laws have already passed through at least 2 readings before entering the 
House of Peoples, can offer some explanation as to why we see more laws being 
passed proportionally in the House of Peoples. 
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Chapter 4 
Discourse on, and Qualitative Analysis of, the Lebanese Chamber of 
Deputies  
 
 This chapter focuses on the evolution of Lebanon’s current governmental 
process.  Additionally, it describes the legislative process of the Lebanese 
parliament and compares it to that of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s.  As mentioned 
before, data limitations about the Lebanese parliamentary proceedings inhibited 
me from conducting a quantitative analysis, similar to that which I had conducted 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly, on the impact of ethnic voting 
on shared governance.  The lack of available data on laws not passed, in addition 
to the lack of detailed parliamentary proceedings, left me able to analyze only the 
laws passed.14 Nonetheless, there was sufficient information about laws passed in 
Lebanon to conduct a similar analysis as I had done for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
adopted laws. I constructed a comparable time frame of analysis, a 13-month 
period, from September 1, 2008 to September, 30, 2009, and analyzed all the laws 
passed within this given time, using information from the Lebanese Parliament’s 
website.  My analysis of the laws adopted during this time period, in addition to 
my analysis of the literature written about the Lebanon parliamentary process 
(particularly in more recent years), provided me with sufficient evidence to draw 
conclusions about shared governance in the Lebanese Parliament.   
                                                            
14
 The Lebanese Parliament Website provides information only on the laws adopted since 2000.  
Nonetheless, there is no information provided on the website about the parliamentary minutes or 
about the laws rejected.  Such information is available, though it is only accessible in hardcopy in 
the National Law Library, in Beirut, Lebanon.   
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As will be discussed in the parliamentary structure section of this chapter, 
the way the Lebanese Parliament is set up allows for a different method of 
determining when a minority veto is invoked.  Since Lebanon has no prescribed 
and formally allocated veto mechanisms, other than that given to the President to 
use if he wishes to force a reconsideration of a law, the equal, 50-50, division of 
seats between the Christians and Muslims in Parliament act as the only way to 
voice ethnoreligious discontent with a proposed law (Chapter III, Section 1, 
Article 57, Lebanese Constitution).15  Since a simple majority is required to pass a 
law in the Lebanese Parliament, neither the Christian nor the Muslim community 
can pass a law alone—there must be some ethnoreligious agreement in order for a 
law to be passed (Chapter II, Article 34, Lebanese Constitution).  Thus, an 
analysis of the laws passed by the Lebanese Parliament will highlight any cross-
ethnoreligious majorities and show which sectors these laws were passed in.  
Discussion of the Development of Current Lebanese Parliamentary Structure 
The long and complex history of consociationalism in Lebanon, 
encompassing more than 60 years, requires a brief overview of the implications of 
Lebanon’s most recent governmental changes. As discussed in my introduction 
and literature review chapter, the Lebanese government experienced 
                                                            
15
 Article 57, in its entirety: The President of the Republic, after consultation with the Council of 
Ministers, has the right to request the reconsideration of a law once during the period prescribed 
for its promulgation.  This request may not be refused.  When the President exercises this right, he 
is not required to promulgate this law until it has been reconsidered and approved by an absolute 
majority of all the members legally composing the Chamber.  If the time limits pass without the 
law being issued or returned, the law is considered legally operative and must be promulgated. 
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consociational reform after the end of the 1980s civil war.  My analysis focuses 
on the Lebanese governmental structure in place today, and the changes stipulated 
in the 1989 Ta’if Accords.  After the end of the Lebanese civil war, the Ta’if 
Accords aimed to alleviate the divisions caused by confessionalism while also 
addressing the much-needed reanalysis of:  a) the redistribution of ethnoreligious 
representation in government (due to the increasing emigration of Lebanese 
Christians and the population increase of the Lebanese Muslim community during 
the civil war era) and b) the power allocation among the different leaders of the 
troika and the overall branches of government.16  Article 95, a new article added 
to the Lebanese Constitution during the Ta’if Accords, called for the creation of a 
National Committee to “take the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of 
political confessionalism according to a transitional plan” (Part F, Article 95, 
Lebanese Constitution). Although Article 95 also stipulated that confessional 
representation in civil service and governmental jobs should be cancelled, top-
level jobs during the first phase of transitioning away from confessionalism were 
still subject to being “shared equally by Christians and Muslims” (Part F, Article 
95, Lebanese Constitution).  As Schmid notes, the Ta’if Accords’ ambiguity about 
when this transitional “deconfessionalizing phase” was to be both implemented 
and completed marginalized the authority of these political institutions and 
provided few incentives for political leaders to move away from confessional 
representation (Schmid, 32). 
                                                            
16
 The troika is the term for the ethnoreligiously based selection of the President, Prime Minister, 
and Speaker of the House in Lebanon.  See the following footnote for more information. 
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This ambiguity is not the only reason for confessionalism’s continuing 
presence in current-day Lebanon.  The Ta’if Accords formally incorporated the 
informal, confessionally-based National Pact of 1943 despite its explicit aim to 
“de-confessionalize” Lebanon (Norton, 461).17  Norton explains that the Ta'if 
Accords “implicitly ratifie[d] the National Pact with its emphasis upon 
confessional compromise and intercommunal cooperation,” and therefore still 
allowed confessional boundaries to exist within the Lebanese government after 
1989 (461).  The three major changes to the Lebanese Parliament perpetuated 
confessionalism in the legislative branch, the only differences being an attempt to 
diversify the power allocation (granting more power to Parliament, and less to the 
President) and the redefinition of the proportional representation ratio (reducing 
the representation of Christians, due to their large emigration in the 30 years 
preceding Ta’if).  The first change in the Parliament was the enlargement of 
Parliament from 99 seats to 108, and the redistribution of seats from the previous 
6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims, to an equal level of representation (50%-50%).  
The Speaker of the House’s (the Shi’a representative in the executive troika) term 
increased from one to four years, giving him a more important role in government 
than previously held before.18  Finally, the Parliament no longer had to share 
                                                            
17
 As mentioned in the introduction, the National Pact of 1943 was an informal agreement that 
stipulated the President of Lebanon should always be a Maronite Christian, that the Prime Minister 
should always be a Sunni Muslim, the President of the National Assembly to be a Shi’a Muslim, 
and the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament to be a Greek Orthodox Christian.  Finally, the National 
Pact also called for Parliament to be divided between Christians and Muslims, via a 6:5 ratio 
derived from the 1932 population census.   
18
 The Speaker of the House holds considerable power in Lebanon’s post-Ta’if government.  He 
can delay presenting to the Parliament proposed laws drafted by the executive branch.  Thus, in a 
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power with the President (the Christian representative in the executive troika): 
Parliament was given the sole right to independently cast votes of no-confidence 
and to dismiss ministers (462).19 
The Ta’if Accords made the Lebanese government more parliamentary in 
nature, equalizing the president and prime minister’s role, whereas previously the 
president wielded the greatest power in government (Ljiphart, 10).  In this way, 
the executive power of the Christians was reduced and equalized to that of the 
Sunnis.   The Sunnis gained by far the most from the Ta’if Accords, as the 
Christians also lost seats in Parliament. This is understandable, however, in light 
of their decreasing population over the years due to emigration.  Nevertheless, the 
Shi’as also suffered losses from the Ta’if Accords.  They are by far the fastest-
growing population in Lebanon, but, even with the reallocation of parliamentary 
seats, they were only able to match the number of seats allocated to the Sunnis—
22 parliamentary seats were reserved for each Muslim sect.  Norton points out 
that due to the high levels of Syrian intervention in Lebanon during the drafting of 
the Ta’if Accords, the Alawis (a predominantly Syrian-based sect of Islam, and 
the dominant religion in the Syrian government) received 2 of the 9 “appointive 
                                                                                                                                                                      
worst case scenario, the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers are “forced to bargain with 
the speaker to ensure that draft laws are placed, within a reasonable amount of time, on the agenda 
of the relevant parliamentary commissions” (Lebanon APS, 7). 
19
 Additionally, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President, but with the consultation of 
Parliament.  Members of Parliament can also suggest candidates for the position (Lebanon APS, 
5). 
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seats,” which he describes as “an obvious concession to the influence of the 
Alawi-dominated government in Damascus” (464).20  Thus, even with the goal of 
providing a more accurate ethnoreligious representation in the Lebanese 
government and especially in the Parliament, the Ta’if Accords fell prey to 
ethnoreligiously-based interests, and still continued to marginalize the ever-
growing Shi’a presence in Lebanon.  The lack of an updated population census 
(the last one was conducted in 1932) also solidified the decade-old governmental 
representation privileges for the different confessional sects. 
In sum, like the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Ta’if 
Accord played more than its intended role as a post-conflict peace agreement.  
Both Dayton and Ta’if were agreements made to end wars and to help initially 
stabilize the political systems in these war-torn countries. The intention of these 
peace agreements was not to become permanent measures that would dictate a 
governmental status quo for years to come—both agreements were drafted with 
the intention that they would be subject to revision and reform as time passed 
(Schmid, 31).  However, the political leaders that discussed and drafted Dayton 
and Ta’if were also those in power during the conflicts that created the need for 
those peace agreements.  These political elites brought to the bargaining table 
their preconceived notions of what they wanted their countries to be, and thus 
were less likely to leave behind their revisionist mentality and work toward shared 
governance.  The point of this discourse is to highlight that current-day Lebanon’s 
                                                            
20
 See Annex II for detailed seat allocation distribution. 
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political system’s structure was not inevitable and reflects powerful 
ethnoreligious political elite interests.  If implemented as intended, the Ta’if 
Accords could have worked to remove confessionalism from Lebanon’s 
government, but due to its legal ambiguity and the political manipulation by 
incentivized elites, Lebanon has remained confessional. 
Structure and Process of the Lebanese Parliament 
 Before delving into the analysis of the laws adopted during the 2008-2009, 
I will give an overview of the Lebanese Parliamentary structure and process, as I 
did for Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In comparison to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s bicameral 
parliamentary assembly, Lebanon’s legislative body, termed the House of 
Deputies in its Constitution, is unicameral.  As mentioned in the previous section, 
the 128 parliamentary seats are equally divided between the Christian and Muslim 
communities in Lebanon and each parliamentary member is elected for a four-
year term of office by regular election procedures.  In addition to parliamentary 
seats being proportionally divided between Christians and Muslims, they are also 
proportionally divided among the “confessional groups within each religious 
community” and among regions (muhafazats) (Chapter II, Article 24, Lebanese 
Constitution).  This concept of geographic proportional representation is similar 
to that present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the parliamentary seat distribution is 
split between the two territorial entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska.  
However, in the case of Lebanon there are six muhafazats (versus two entities in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) and each muhafaza has an allocated number of 
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representatives from different confessional groups.21  Thus, confessionalism is not 
only present in the political parties and administration structure, but also in the 
electoral process.  Nonetheless, in contrast to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the quorum in 
the Lebanese Parliament is not based upon a cross-confessional presence: a 
simple majority of parliamentary members present constitutes a quorum (Chapter 
II, Article 34, Lebanese Constitution).   Additionally, a majority vote is all that is 
required for laws and decisions to be passed.  However, as discussed before, the 
fact that a majority cannot be constituted by one ethnoreligious community 
implies that a cross-confessional agreement is necessary in order for decisions to 
be passed. 
In terms of the legislative process, the Lebanese Parliament is similar to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly, in which both the Parliament and 
Council of Ministers are able to introduce draft laws in the House of Deputies 
(Part B, Chapter 1, Article 18, Lebanese Constitution).  Draft laws can be 
introduced in two ways.  First, the Council of Ministers can vote on whether to 
propose a draft law to the President, who is entitled by the Constitution to 
introduce all laws proposed by the Council of Ministers to the plenary (Chapter 
III, Section I, Article 53, Lebanese Constitution).   If the Council of Ministers has 
a two-thirds majority vote in favor of proposing the law, then the President 
                                                            
21
 For example, in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the South Lebanon district was required to 
have 11 candidates: five Shi’a, two Maronites, one Sunni, one Druze, one Greek Orthodox, and 
one Greek Catholic.  See Ryan, Benjamin.  NOW You Know: Voting in Lebanon.  18 January, 
2008. 
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=27140 
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receives the proposed law.22  Second, the parliamentary members (a maximum of 
ten) can submit to the plenary a proposed law (IFES, 5). 
 After the introduction of a law, the Parliamentary Bureau Board, 
consisting of the Speaker of the House (Sh’ia Muslim), the Deputy Speaker, two 
secretaries, and three commissioners, send draft laws to the relevant specialized 
committee, allowing one month for review in closed sessions (UNDP Report on 
Lebanon’s Parliament).23  After the process of committee review, the draft is sent 
to the plenary for a vote.  The Parliament has the reserved capability to return a 
draft law back to its original review committee, another committee, or a joint 
committee, before the vote takes place, if it deems a reconsideration of the law 
necessary (UNDP Report on Lebanon’s Parliament).  A law passed by a majority 
vote in the Chamber of Deputies is then passed to the Council of Ministers for 
consideration.  If the draft law is approved by the Council of Ministers, the Prime 
Minister and relevant ministers are required to sign the law, and then pass it along 
to the President, who has the final say on the draft law.  If the President ratifies 
the law, it is adopted, and published in the Official Gazette.  If not, he may either 
reject the law or pass it back to the Chamber of Deputies for reconsideration, in 
which case a majority vote in the plenary is necessary for the reconsidered draft 
law to become adopted (Chapter III, Section I, Article 57, Lebanese Constitution).  
                                                            
22
 The Council of Ministers is appointed by the Prime Minister, in consultation with the President 
and Parliament.  Seats in the Council are allocated on a confessional basis, based upon the 
proportional representation of each sect (Lebanon APS, 5). 
23
 All committee reviews are conducted in secret, unless otherwise noted.  Currently, there are 15 
standing parliamentary committees. 
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Overall, the Parliament acts as intermediary reviewer of draft laws, sharing its 
legislative power with the Prime Minister and the President. 
Analysis of Laws Adopted by the Lebanese Government, September, 2008 to 
September, 2009 
 Table 13: Laws Adopted and Laws Not Adopted in the Chamber of 
Deputies of Lebanon 
September 1, 2008 – September 30, 2009 
Sources: Lebanese Parliamentary Website 
 
Law Sector 
n = 49 
 
Laws 
Adopted  
% Laws 
Adopted 
Controversial 9 18.8% 
 
Education 3  
 
Religion  1  
 
Identity/ 
Symbology 
2  
 
Territorial Issues 3  
Non-Controversial/ 
Other 
39 81.2% 
Unclear 1  
TOTAL (Shaded Rows) 48 100% 
 During the analyzed time period, 19% of the laws passed were in 
controversial sectors.  Education and territorial-related issues were the two largest 
controversial sub-sectors with laws passed, each compromising a third of the 
controversial laws passed and 6% of the overall laws passed.  Each of the three 
educational laws dealt with the appointment of officials in the education system 
(primary and secondary schooling).  One was in fact an amendment to a previous 
educational law, Education Law 442. The amendments were made to compensate 
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primary and secondary school governmentally-contracted teachers who lost 
salaries between 2004 and 2006. However, none of these three laws addressed the 
content of the educational curriculum, even though the National Parliament does 
have some competencies in that area.  Despite Article 10 of the Constitution 
dictating that religious communities can have their own schools as long as they 
follow public regulations and do not interfere with “the dignity of any of the 
religions or creeds,” there still has not been much governmental regulation of 
religiously-based educational institutions (Chapter 2, Article 10, Lebanese 
Constitution).  Much criticism has been given to the Lebanese government for its 
lax approach in creating a unified educational system and critics claim that the 
lack of universal educational materials is “largely responsible for the lack of 
political unity and cultural integrity” (Salem, 238).  Regarding other controversial 
sectors, laws that dealt with territorial issues included one which separated a 
village into two separate villages, though it was unclear if this was done along 
confessional lines.    
Comparison to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly and Conclusions 
After analyzing the laws passed in Lebanon in this given time period, a 
comparison to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliament can provide explanations as to 
why differences exist between these two legislative branches.  The unicameral 
structure of the Lebanese Parliament differs from the bicameral structure of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly. Thus, in comparison with the 
legislative process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Lebanese parliamentary process 
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has essentially one reading prescribed for each draft law.24  However, if the 
President calls for a reconsideration of a law, the draft law goes through a second 
reading.  The difference in the number of readings plays an important role in how 
ethnoreligious cooperation occurs in both countries’ legislative assemblies.  As I 
have argued in the section on my analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s laws, the laws 
that consistently pass through each reading are the ones that are more likely to be 
adopted.  Thus, as we saw in the laws adopted in the second reading of the House 
of Peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, most of the laws that made it to that stage were 
passed.  Through the use of this “filtering” mechanism, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
legislative process provides ample opportunity for ethnoreligious groups to come 
to an agreement on contested laws, if desired, but also provides more 
opportunities for laws to be blocked.   
The Lebanese Parliament takes a different approach to emphasizing shared 
governance; one which I argue is more direct in nature.  One reading, the 
presidential power to veto any law, in addition to only having two convened 
parliamentary sessions each year, the members in the Lebanese Parliament have 
fewer opportunities to consistently block laws.  Though both countries have a 
minority veto, formalized in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and informally 
implemented in the case of Lebanon, the ease of minority vetoing in the Lebanese 
                                                            
24Theoretically, the Lebanese Parliament was supposed to be amended to become bicameral.  The 
Ta’if Accord called for the creation of an Upper House, once the first parliament was “elected on a 
national, non-confessional basis.”  The Upper House was intended to be the representative 
assembly for the different confessions, while the Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) would 
become a non-sectarian representative assembly. See Arab Political Systems: Baseline 
Information and Reforms – Lebanon. 
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Parliament is surprising: since no single confession constitutes a majority in the 
Parliament, the negative, or absent, voting by one confession is enough to reject 
laws.  Nonetheless, as the literature suggests, we do not see a debilitating abuse of 
the “informal” minority vetoing in Lebanon—rather, as will be described below, a 
fair number of proposed laws actually end up being passed (based upon statistics 
evident in the literature). 
Even though there is essentially only “one reading” of a draft law once it 
is introduced to the Parliament, there is still ample opportunity for a draft law to 
be rejected, as seen by the many consideration levels a draft level must undergo.  
Nonetheless, as much of the research done on the Lebanese parliamentary process 
shows, the Lebanese Parliament has evolved into an  “instrument for blind 
approval of governmental projects and proposals”—very rarely do governmental 
projects and proposals get rejected by the Lebanese Parliament (Haddad, 213). 
The fact that many of the parliamentarians and ministers are either related to 
members in the executive branch or have served in previous parliaments creates 
an “elitist club” of politicians in the Lebanese government that is intertwined with 
personal interests. Rarely does the Lebanese Parliament work as a counter-
balance, or oppositional force, to the executive branch.  Therefore, in comparison 
to the Parliamentary Assembly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Council of Ministers 
and the President play a more active role in the legislative process in Lebanon, 
sometimes to the extent of dominating it.  
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Important Implications about Conclusions 
The increased enumeration of rights to the Lebanese Parliament after the 
Ta’if Accords restored some faith in the legislative branch, which was previously 
seen as incapable of accomplishing anything without the consent of the President, 
since the Speaker of the House played a minimal role at best before 1989 (204).  
As mentioned before, the Speaker of the House plays a more visible and powerful 
role in the post-Ta’if government.  For example, Nabih Berri (the Speaker of the 
House) shut down Parliament in 2008, in order to postpone sessions as a way to 
obstruct the anti-Syrian March 14 coalition from electing a President (Wählisch, 
3).  Nonetheless, even with the increased power allocated to the Parliament after 
1989, we do not see much change in the placidity of the Lebanese Parliament. 
Haddad makes an important point about the Lebanese Parliament, stating that its 
“main function is not to legislate (a function reserved for the cabinet [Council of 
Ministers]), but to represent a community, constituency and interests” (213).  The 
perpetuated presence of the troika after Ta’if created a “hegemonic institution 
based on clientelist constituencies and needs” that marginalized the powers 
enumerated to the other branches of governments, including the legislative branch 
and therefore the Parliament (213).  Thus, even though many, if not most, of the 
laws proposed in the Lebanese Parliament were passed in recent years, an 
indication of parliamentary efficiency, it also highlights the fact that the 
Parliament is not a political institution that is able to independently function 
without the dominating oversight and pressure from the troika. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Societal and Comparative Implications 
 
Consociational agreements are becoming an increasingly popular method 
of stabilizing post-conflict heterogeneous societies, with the most recent example 
being the drafting of a consociational agreement for current-day Iraq.  
Nonetheless, despite evidence demonstrating that the implementation of a 
consociational agreement can provide successful results with regards to ending a 
sectarian conflict, the process of granting equal political and societal 
representation to the different warring factions does not always result in shared 
governance.  In fact, consociationalism can further exasperate ethnic cleavages 
within a society and cause problematic interactions between its different societal 
cleavages.  This is particularly present in the political realm, due to the ingraining 
of ethnoreligious identification in political representation. Thus, a study of the 
post-implementation period of consociational agreements is crucial in 
understanding their long-term effects on deeply divided societies. 
My hypothesis is that the more a minority veto is formally 
institutionalized in a post-war deeply divided society’s legislature, the more 
difficult it will be for ethnoreligious parties to cooperate within the country’s 
parliament.  Using Bosnia-Herzegovina as an example of a country with a 
formalized minority veto, and Lebanon as a country with an informal, implicit, 
minority veto, I analyzed the set of laws passed in both countries’ national 
parliamentary assemblies, in addition to the laws not passed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, during a 13-month period (2008-2009).  I conceptualized 
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cooperation within the country’s parliament as shared governance, which involves 
laws passed by more than one communal group.  Additionally, I looked at 
whether there were more instances of minority vetoes, and thus rejection of laws, 
in ethnoreligiously controversial sectors, versus non-controversial sectors.  Due to 
limited data, I was unable to conduct the same quantitative analysis as I had done 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina, regarding laws rejected in Lebanon.  Nonetheless, an 
analysis of laws adopted, in addition to an in-depth analysis of the literature, 
provided me with adequate evidence to make the observations discussed in the 
Findings section below.  In brief, my findings show that formalized minority 
vetoes do indeed hinder the parliamentary process.  Compared to the majority 
laws of being passed in Lebanon’s Parliament as suggested in the literature, little 
over half of the laws proposed in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliament were passed 
between June 2008 and June 2009.  Thus, Lebanon, an informal minority veto 
system, has a higher percentage of overall laws compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
a formalized minority veto system.  It was evident though that there was not an 
overwhelming use of minority vetoes in controversial sectors in the laws rejected 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the majority of minority veto invocations were for non-
controversial laws.  Additionally, there was a reasonable amount of laws passed in 
controversial sectors in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon – not all laws 
passed were solely in non-controversial sectors.  Thus, knowing whether a law 
falls into a controversial or non-controversial sector is far from sufficient in 
determining whether a law will be rejected or adopted – in a formalized minority 
veto system every law is subjected to controversy.  
98 
 
Findings: Bosnia – Herzegovina  
 As discussed in my previous chapters, there are several differences within 
and between the parliamentary assemblies in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Lebanon that accounts for the aforementioned findings.  Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
bicameral legislature, with each house having two readings of each draft law 
(unless reviewed under urgent procedure), incorporates a filtering effect for 
proposed laws.  The progression of laws from the first reading in the House of 
Representatives to the second reading in the House of Peoples appears to lead to a 
decrease in the overall number of laws not passed in each reading.  Nonetheless, 
despite more laws (as a percentage of the total laws in each reading) being passed 
with each consequent review, we still see the use of entity vetoing in each 
reading, up to and including the second reading of the House of Peoples (the last 
reading level possible for a law under most circumstances).  Furthermore, the fact 
that most of the laws that invoked an entity veto were non-controversial in nature 
suggests that any sector can be ethnically controversial, a point which I will 
discuss below.   
Proposed laws that were submitted with the intention of addressing issues that 
aimed to improve the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, using a unilateral approach, 
aroused ethnic controversy.  The Proposed Law on Border Control, with the 
Report by the Joint Committee for Defence and Safety, sparked debate on the 
competencies of the country as a whole.  The following excerpt from the 
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parliamentary minutes shows some of the dialogue that occurred during the 
discussion of this law:  
Another fierce exchange [occurred] between SNSD and SDA with SDA 
calling upon the High Representative to impose the Law and doubting the 
functioning of BiH with passive conduct by the IC [international community], 
and SNSD responding that calls for dictatorship and protectorate would not 
ensure the democracy and consensus in the country (OHR 33rd Parliamentary 
Session Minutes, Item 11).   
A more interesting heated discussion was provoked by the non-controversial law, 
the Proposed Law on MOVCON (Movement Control), which was rejected in the 
first reading due to the negative opinion of the Joint Defense and Security 
Committee in the 36th parliamentary session.  As shown in the following excerpt 
from the parliamentary minutes, the ethnically-sparked debate had nothing to do 
with the content itself, but rather the discussion of the law provided a means to 
express other grievances: 
Several hours of very tense and unconstructive debate, around state vs 
entity, who answers to whom and which body, transfer of competency or 
no, (non)involvement of the High Representative.  Discussion also 
revealed lack of basic understanding of provisions of this law, and vast 
part of the discussion did not concern the substance of the law in the first 
place (OHR 36th Parliamentary Session Minutes, Item 3). 
Thus, it is apparent that the law sector was not the only factor in determining 
whether a law was controversial or not.  Questions about the competencies of the 
entities, regarding the implementation and enforcement of laws, were one of the 
largest factors that stimulated debate, and were the basis of several of the entity 
vetoes invoked by the Republika Srpska. 
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 Nonetheless, within Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly, we 
see a variation in the amount of laws passed between the two houses.  There is a 
significant decrease in the number of laws rejected in the House of Peoples when 
compared to the House of Representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary 
Assembly during 2008-2009.  Two reasons can be attributed to this.  First, there 
are fewer members in the House of Peoples than there are in the House of 
Representatives. With only 15 members in the House of Peoples, it is much easier 
to reach a unanimous consensus, as we see happen quite often during this time 
period.  Additionally, the fact the three ethnoreligious groups are combined into 
caucuses in the House of Peoples further reduces the voting complexity that 
comes along with multiple individuals, and thus multiple opinions, as we see 
present in the House of Representatives.  Nonetheless, with the same ease that 
laws can be passed in the House of Peoples, they can be rejected.  Though a 
smaller upper House can provide incentives for cooperation, it can also easily be 
turned into a non-functioning forum.  The failure of one community to show up to 
a parliamentary session, in addition to if there are less than 3 members from each 
group present, can be reasons as to why a quorum was not reached.  Thus, the 
following reason may account more for explaining why more laws are passed in 
the House of Peoples.   
As discussed before, the increased adoption of laws in the House of 
Peoples can be due to the filtering of laws in the first two reading in the House of 
Representatives – once a law reaches the House of Peoples, it has a higher 
probability of being passed, if it has already been reviewed twice before.  
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Nonetheless, we do see some invocations of the entity veto in the House of 
Peoples, which is surprising to see, particularly when invoked in the second 
reading – even after passing through three reviews, a law can still be deemed 
“controversial” to an ethnoreligious groups’ interest.  Nonetheless, this should not 
be viewed as a reflection of the efficiency of the parliamentary process in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Milorad Dodik, the current prime minister of the Republika Srpska 
(RS) and president of the RS-Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), in 
power since 2006, has been pushing for a radical restructuring of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into three separate, “self-determined”, ethnoreligiously-based 
entities.25  Mujkić argues that Dodik’s increasingly debilitating resistance 
movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is due to his theory of ideological 
differentiation, in which he “distance[s] himself clearly from so-called Sarajevo 
politicians…politicians who are ethnically Bosniac” (Mujkić, 164).  Thus, the use 
of the RS entity veto in recent years is not only used to reject laws that “threaten” 
the interests of the Republika Srpska, but also to act as a means of destabilizing 
the legitimacy of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian state, and provide support for the RS 
nationalist and secessionist movement (171-172).  
Findings: Lebanon 
 By analyzing Lebanon’s legislative process, I was able to shed light on the 
differences between Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s parliamentary 
assemblies.  As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, Lebanon’s informal minority 
                                                            
25
 He was also in power from 1998-2001, also as prime minister of the Republika Srpska. 
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veto was operationalized through the fact that laws are passed in the Lebanese 
Parliament via a simple majority vote.  The fact that the Lebanese parliamentary 
seats are divided equally between the Christians and Muslims (after the 
implementation of the Ta’if Accords) ensures that one religious community is 
incapable of passing legislature on its own.  Despite not having access to the laws 
not passed in Lebanon during my time period of analysis (2008-2009), the 
literature indicates that we do not see an overwhelming rejection of laws in the 
Lebanese Parliament.26  Several factors can describe why this trend exists.  First, 
in comparison to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the lack of a formalized minority veto does 
not provide the opportunity for the Lebanese confessions to specifically “protect” 
their interests – the only confessional assurance is the fact that no one group can 
dominate the parliamentary process due to the aforementioned majority voting.  
Thus, there is more of an implicit emphasis on cooperation within the Lebanese 
Parliament – if there is no cooperation between the different sects, no laws will be 
passed.  Since the Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina holds a majority in the 
House of Representatives, draft laws can theoretically be passed in the House of 
Representatives with just votes from the Federation, granted there is no entity 
veto invoked by the Republika Srpska.  This caveat is not present in the Lebanese 
Parliament, where a unicameral house with a majority vote mechanism provides 
the only opportunity for laws to be adopted.   
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 See Haddad. 
103 
 
 However, it is important to stress that the Lebanese Parliament’s 
legislative power is closely intertwined with that of the executive branch.  The 
large role the President and Prime Minister play in both the proposal and 
ratification of laws largely undermines the Lebanese Parliament’s capability and 
independence in creating legislation.  Nevertheless, even with the rights 
enumerated to the Lebanese Parliament, we do not see it acting as an oppositional, 
or checks-and-balances, force to the executive troika.  If anything, the Parliament 
acts as a perpetuator of the decisions made by the troika.  This is primarily due to 
the fact that the political elite sphere in Lebanon is a continual regurgitation of 
previous political generations and ideologies.  Nearly a third of parliamentary 
members at any time, since the adoption of the Ta’if Accords, have been elected 
to earlier parliaments or are closely related to ministers or former deputies 
(Hudson, 29).  This “elitist club” of politics in Lebanon, where elections and 
parliamentary membership are dominated by familial ties and pre-stacked 
coalitions, has nonetheless evolved over time, allowing newer faces and 
oppositional movements to enter the political sphere.27  However, it is important 
to keep this in mind when discussing Lebanese politics, particularly in terms of 
governmental efficiency – is the fact that more laws are passed in the Lebanese 
Parliament due to greater efficiency or a more closely-knit, incentivized circle of 
elites?  Thus, when analyzing whether laws are being passed, it is not so much a 
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 This may be the case for Bosnia-Herzegovina too, but it is not as widely mentioned in the 
literature as being the one of the main criticisms against the political system in place.   
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matter of the content of the laws that is important, but rather who is in power at 
the time and the coalitions they have forged. 
Societal Implications of Consociational Arrangements 
 During Summer 2009, I traveled to Bosnia-Herzegovina to conduct 
interviews with local non-governmental organizations, international non-
governmental organizations, political parties, and international organizations 
based in the country, to understand the political perceptions of each different 
group in Bosnia-Herzegovina.28  Additionally, I traveled to Vienna, Austria to talk 
with individuals at the headquarters of the predominant international 
organizations present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to see if there is a difference in 
perception between international workers “in the field” and those back in the 
headquarters.29 Specifically, my interviews aimed at understanding the different 
perceptions regarding the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and how 
such a consociational agreement has affected Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political and 
                                                            
28
 I selected the people with whom I conducted interviews based upon my research about both the 
domestic and international non-governmental organization (NGO) scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Most importantly, I chose to interview NGOs in their various forms due to the fact that I wanted to 
get as close to a public opinion survey, without actually being able to conduct my own survey 
analysis.  I read about each group’s mission statements and works before choosing them, in order 
to assure that I got a wide range of views.  I also chose to interview (or ask at the very least) the 
most prominent political parties and international institutions involved in the governmental 
process (i.e. Office of the High Representative) in order to gain a clearer understanding of the 
actual governmental process. 
29
 See Annex III for a list of all the organizations I interviewed.  All of the interviews were 
conducted in English and most were conducted in Sarajevo, though a few were conducted via 
Skype and phone calls with branch offices in Tuzla and Mostar. 
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societal development to this day.30  It is absolutely necessary to address the 
subjective implications of consociational agreements.  Consociationalism is not 
only a means of structuring a government; its influence penetrates into every 
aspect of society.  Division of territory reduces ethnoreligious diversification (e.g. 
Republika Srpska being predominantly Bosnian Serb, Southern Lebanon being 
predominantly Shi’a Muslim).  The perpetuation of ethnoreligious and 
nationalistic political parties causes voters and individual members of society to 
constantly be reminded of the necessity of religious and ethnic identification.  
Education is rifted by religious and ethnic narratives in many consociational 
societies.  Thus, a study of consociationalism should not only involve an analysis 
of the governmental processes that are associated with this system of plural 
democracy, but of also the societal breadth it entails. 
 For the purposes of confidentiality, I cannot specifically list each 
representative’s views.  Additionally, the views of these individuals are primarily 
personal views, and do not reflect the views of their employers and organizations, 
though rarely did any individual speak out against their employer/organization’s 
mission statement or goals.  Overall, despite the varying opinions of my 
interviewees, each representative was clear to state that the current governmental 
structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina is dysfunctional.  The common consensus was 
also that Dayton served its role to end the Bosnian war, but that it was not meant 
to be the basis of a long-term, unrevised, governmental structure.  The 
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 Annex IV is the list of interview questions I used during my interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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discrepancies between the different organizations thus arose between whether or 
not reform should take place now in current-day Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if 
reform should be an option, how it should be undertaken and in which sectors. 
 Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in the Federation, 
specifically Sarajevo, generally want to see immediate reform of the current 
governmental structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina.31  Most local non-governmental 
organizations said they wanted “a single government,” one that was not based on 
ethnic divisions.   Thus, they wish to see the creation of a unitary Bosnian state, 
one that is compromised of Bosnian citizens.  In my interviews, I never asked of 
the ethnic origin of any of my interviewees – something which all of my 
interviewees found surprising.  Notably, the president of a non-partisan 
community development NGO said that it was surprising that as a foreigner and a 
researcher on Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was not inquiring about the ethnic origin of 
my interviewees.  She said that was an inspiring notion for her to see, since she 
felt that most international researchers on Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition to 
many domestic researchers, usually frame their research around ethnic divisions, 
i.e. what do Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks want?  The reason for such her 
surprise is touched upon by the following quote from an analyst from 
Transparency International, who sheds light on why the perpetuation of ethnic 
identity still exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina:  
                                                            
31
 I was unable to meet with any organizations based in the Republika Srpska due to most of them 
being closed for the summer holidays.  Most of the Sarajevo offices also have offices in the 
Republika Srpska, but I was unable to ascertain that there was not a difference of opinion between 
the different branch offices. 
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During the war, people were forced to pick sides.  This just created a sort 
of status quo that is hard to break.  Bosnian people are not so 
revolutionary.  They would rather keep a “bad system” in place rather than 
being revolutionary, for fear of things getting out of hand.  Even if people 
say they are open for voting for multiethnic parties, once they get behind 
the ballot box, it is evident through the continual re-election of 
nationalistic parties that their words differ from their actions.   
Thus, the main goal of most locally-run NGOs based in the Federation  is to help 
to de-construct the ethnoreligious, nationalistically-based mentality present in the 
country after Dayton, through helping to create a viable and functioning, unified 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Furthermore, the reforms they advocate for the most part, 
besides constitutional and governmental reforms, is increased transparency in, and 
the de-ethnification of, the media, particularly in rural areas. 
Internationally-run NGOs share many of the same beliefs as their domestic 
counterparts.  Nonetheless, there are a few differences present, particularly 
between whether it was the views expressed by an ex-patriot or an employed local 
working for an internationally-run NGO.  Following the same points of discussion 
as locally-run NGOs, a local working as a reporter for the Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network (BIRN) further discusses the repercussions of putting off 
reform of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s governmental structure, particularly in terms of 
its effect on society: 
As an individual, I would say the power-sharing agreements were not 
appropriate.  I remember being furious when I heard that Dayton was 
being implemented.  These power-sharing agreements are based on 
nationalism.  The people who negotiated them were nationalists.  I am a 
Bosnian – not a Serb, not a Croat, and not a Bosniac – because I am a 
citizen of this country. There is definitely a movement among the younger 
generation to push to create this “Bosnian” identity but it is quiet 
[small].  What BiH needs is a loud and independent media, one that can 
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help break people away from always hearing divisive news run by the 
nationalists.  
 
Thus, as mentioned in the goals of locally-run NGOs, the emphasis on re-creating 
the notion of identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as one that is citizen, versus ethnic-
based, is seen as a crucial step towards sustainable reform. 
The difference though between locally-run NGOs based in the Federation 
and locals working in internationally-run NGOs is not their views as to how to 
reform the country, but rather the approach they take to fulfill their goal.  
Generally, locally-run NGOs work on a more locally-orientated, micro-scale, 
implementing individual projects. On the other hand, locals working in 
internationally-run NGOs attempt to address the issues of reform via a top-down 
approach.  The contribution of locals in internationally-run NGOs in the areas of 
mass media and international reporting provides these reformists and activists a 
larger audience to gear their efforts towards. 
Nonetheless, internationals in these internationally-run NGOs took a 
different approach in discussing the reform process for Bosnia-Herzegovina.  For 
the most part, these individuals focused more on discussing how working towards 
preparing the country for accession to the European Union can be beneficial for 
both reforming the governmental structure and creating a sustainable and viable 
Bosnian state.  Individuals in both the International Crisis Group and the 
International Republican Institute explicitly mentioned this as the only possible 
option for reform for Bosnia-Herzegovina at this time, as explained in depth in the 
following quote from my interview with the latter organization: 
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The best reform path that BiH can take, in terms of gaining enough 
consensuses behind it, would be to follow the EU integration process 
recommendations.  Besides Belgium, BiH is the only European nation that 
does not have a Ministry of Agriculture and we are primarily a rural 
country.  These reforms are just realistic – there is a gross amount of 
agencies and bureaucracy present in this country but nothing gets done, 
while simultaneously, crucial parts of government are missing.  No one 
can deny that the EU reforms, at minimum, are necessary, but still they 
[nationalistic political parties] refuse to partake in them. 
 
Thus, for the lack of more comprehensive reform plans, internationally-run NGOs 
see the EU accession reforms as a good starting point to improving the situation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite knowing they do not address all the problems in the 
governmental structure. 
My interviews with political parties were much more limited compared to 
my interviews with the other types of organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I had 
aimed to interview both nationalistic and non-nationalistic parties, in order to gain 
a comprehensive view of the varying opinions between the different types of 
political parties.  Unfortunately, due to language barriers (the main three 
nationalistic parties (SDA, HDZ, and SNSD) had no public representative that 
spoke English) and unwillingness of all three public relation offices to answer a 
brief questionnaire in B/H/S, I was unable to conduct interviews with nationalistic 
parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Nonetheless, I did have the opportunity to meet 
with a non-partisan, non-nationalistic party, Naša Stranka, which was recently 
created in 2008.32  One of this party’s founders was the Academy Award-
                                                            
32
 See Annex I for listing of BiH political party.  B/H/S stands for the trinational languages of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian, Croatian (H comes from Hrvatski, the name of the language in 
Croatian), and Serbian. 
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acclaimed Bosnian director, Danis Tanović.  The representative I met with in 
Naša Stranka provided insights into the problems a “citizen-based” political party 
faces in a predominantly monoethnic nationalist-based political area.  Their 
underlying platform is that the power-sharing arrangements in the country need to 
be reviewed.  Nonetheless, their more realistic, immediate goals are to increase: a) 
the emphasis on local self-governance and b) the awareness of the necessity of 
“dealing with the past.”  Thus, the more individual, local emphasis these non-
nationalistic parties take, in addition to their fairly new and different ideology 
when compared to their political party counterparts, keeps them operating at the 
cantonal, municipal, and local government level, versus the national political 
arena.   
I was most surprised with my interviews with international organizations 
based in the country due to their level of self-criticism.  The individual from the 
Office of the High Representative whom I interviewed mentioned that Dayton 
Peace Accords as a whole was “not bad” – it was just Annex IV that was “deeply 
problematic.”33  Annex VII followed International Human Rights Provisions and 
theoretically would have helped create social and economic conditions suitable 
for sustainable return.34  Nonetheless, as mentioned before, problems arose mostly 
                                                            
33
 Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Accords is the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, used to this 
day.  Annex IV is the foundational outline of the power-sharing agreements in the country, 
particularly at the national level. 
34
 Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Accords is the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons.  
Annex VII called for creating suitable conditions for post-war returnees, creating a national 
refugee return commission, and enumerating rights for refugees and displaced persons. 
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from the implementation, or the lack of implementation (i.e. how Annex VII was 
never realized), of these internationally-crafted agreements.  The official was keen 
to mention that Dayton Peace Accords were prematurely adopted, mostly to help 
quickly end the war.  The “big push” to have elections, re-enforced and accepted 
the political parties that were involved in the war.  Thus, the fact that Dayton was 
implemented with an executive mandate in a country with new and fragile 
democratic institutions, helped provide the opportunity for abuse of the post-war 
political system by nationalistic parties.  
Finally, I was able to conduct interviews at officials from the Organisation 
for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Mission Office in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and at the OSCE Headquarters in Vienna, Austria.  I will not be able 
to list specific examples of answers to questions from my interviews at both 
locations due to confidentiality protocol – the interviews are specifically 
representative of the individual themselves and should not be affiliated by any 
means with their overarching organization.  Nonetheless, to make a generalized 
observation, there is a disjoint between headquarters and the mission office as to 
understanding the ramifications of the ethnoreligious power-sharing agreements 
on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s society.  At headquarters, there was a feeling that there 
was not enough recognition in the country that Bosnia-Herzegovina has always 
been a “divided” society, and will continue to be such – thus, the emphasis is that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s fate is in its own hand.  The EU accession process, though 
not as specific as it could be, is all the international community can offer at this 
point.  Nonetheless, both headquarters and the mission office agreed that no 
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imposed solution will work now in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This realization, in 
addition to my research on civil society mobilization in the country, show that a 
fundamental shift in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political mentality and an increased 
activism from its civil society is necessary to move the country forward.  The 
prolonged presence of international institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, seeing 
limited success when compared to their ambitions, has caused an increasing sense 
of unknowingness as to what role they can play in the country.  The international 
community no longer carries enough leverage to influence decisions and reforms 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore the need for the country to move towards 
self-sustainability is becoming more apparent. 
 Due to time and funding limitations, I was unable to go to Lebanon to 
conduct a similar rigorous interview schedule with various organizations in the 
country.  Nonetheless, similar low public opinion is present in Lebanon, with 
regards to the efficiency and functioning of its government structure.  Notable 
scholars on Lebanon, such as Eli Salem and Simon Haddad, have incorporated 
much public opinion data and research into their work.  Without making broad 
generalizations, there does to seem to be an overall discontent with the Lebanese 
governmental structure within the country’s populace.  Salem argues that the 
following characteristics of the Lebanese government mar both its efficiency and 
public image: 
1. Absence of self-government given Syria’s entrenched role in the Lebanese 
political arena;  
2. The lack of accountability. Former militia leaders and communal leaders 
for the most part wield power through pressure, influence and money; 
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3. Ambiguous distinctions between the public and private sectors.  Top 
governmental officials often have personal interests attached to “private” 
sectors such as real estate; 
4. Long history of corruption throughout all levels of government, with “no 
serious program to combat it” (Salem, 668). 
 
Additionally, Haddad notes that these aforementioned problems are present within 
all the confessional groups in Lebanon.  However, since each confessional 
group’s elites benefit from this easily-manipulated governmental system, 
cooperation does take place in the sense that all the political elites agree to keep 
the system the way it is.  Thus, for both my case studies, it can be concluded that 
the different ethnoreligious groups do cooperate when it comes to ensuring that 
the nationalistic/confessional parties continue to benefit from the fragmented 
political system in place.  Cooperation for the sake of corruption is apparent in 
both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon and is mainly the reason why the public in 
both consociational societies is disillusioned with the efficiency and capacity of 
their political institutions and political parties.  Thus, even though a broad 
generalization about the effects of the level of formality of a consociational 
regime is not possible from using just two case studies, the following conclusion 
does at least hold true for the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon.   It is 
apparent that though consociationalism does provide a means for the different 
ethnoreligious groups to be represented and active within both countries’ 
governments, the level of shared governance in both countries’ Parliaments was 
not contingent on the structure of the system (e.g. formality of veto rights), but 
rather the willingness of the different political elites to work together.   
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Future Research 
For future research, it would be ideal to gather more parliamentary data 
about Lebanon, in addition to the conduct interviews with Lebanese 
organizations, institutions, and parties.  The only possible way to have access to 
complete parliamentary archives is to travel to Lebanon, where all parliamentary 
minutes and proceedings are maintained in the National Law Library, located in 
Beirut.   Having access to the complete parliamentary proceedings would allow 
for a more comparable quantitative analysis, as I had conducted for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, since there would be more information available on laws rejected 
and parliamentary voting.  There is also room to improve my quantitative analysis 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Access to the laws in their entirety, versus just the titles, 
would allow for a more thorough and deeper analysis of the content of the law, 
helping to highlight particularly reasons as to why laws were or were not 
controversial.   More investigation of the House of Peoples, in terms of how the 
smaller number of members affects cooperation, can also be useful in further 
emphasizing my assertion.  Additionally, more complete parliamentary minutes, 
in addition to consistent report of parliamentary voting, would help to increase the 
strength of the claims made by my observations and analysis of the OHR 
parliamentary minutes.   
Comparative Implications 
In terms of the application of my theory, it would be valuable to do a 
broader analysis of consociational governments, to see if my results also apply to 
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other consociational societies.  Thus, increasing the number of countries of focus 
can be useful for both further investigation and combining the implications of my 
theory.  In particular, Iraq would be a good country to incorporate, since it is 
currently undergoing a multi-faceted transition process.  From authoritarianism, to 
civil strife and disarray, to now consociationalism, Iraq’s governmental and 
societal situation is similar to that of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s during the early to 
mid-1990s.  As we have seen with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon, 
consociationalism has allocated equal rights to the major ethnoreligious groups in 
each country, but has simultaneously also ensured that ethnoreligious identity 
remains at the forefront of the government and political system.  Experiencing 
just its second parliamentary elections since the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 
this past March, 2010, Iraq is facing the same inherent questions that arise from 
consociationalism’s overemphasis on representation rather than integration.  What 
does ensuring such the representation of each different ethnoreligious group in 
Iraq in government mean for Iraq’s future, in terms of stability and sustainability?  
With such a newly-fledged consociational democracy in the making, it is 
imperative to analyze the implications of such an agreement early on, rather than 
decades later, in order to make any necessary reforms before the process and 
ideologies become too entrenched within both the government and society.  
Minority vetoes are a useful mechanism in ensuring that no minority group can be 
marginalized by the ethnic group that compromises the largest constituency (i.e. 
the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Shi’as in Lebanon and Iraq), particularly 
in the volatile years after the end of conflict.  Nevertheless, the presence of 
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minority vetoes, particularly the more formalized they are, can be problematic in 
the long-run and subjected to abuse by incentivized political elites.  Thus, perhaps 
an implicit or more narrowly defined minority veto can provide the “best of both 
worlds:” ensuring that no ethnic group is marginalized, while also providing the 
flexibility that comes with not having a formally institutionalized minority veto.  
Regardless, the emphasis should not only be on the structure of the system when 
it comes to deciding how to incorporate minority rights.  The history of 
interaction between a consociational society’s political elites can also offer some 
guidance as to whether a more formal minority veto system should be 
implemented.  The most important realization should be that though formal 
minority vetoes can be useful in ensuring proper allocation of rights, they should 
not be deemed as long-term solutions.  A reformist and dynamic political 
mentality is necessary to ensure the sustainability and long-term efficiency of a 
consociational democracy. 
In conclusion, as evident by my quantitative findings and qualitative 
analysis of the laws passed and rejected in 2008-2009 in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
Parliamentary Assembly, the sector of a law played a small role in shaping the 
debate on whether a law should or should not be adopted.  It was not so much a 
question of whether a law was controversial in nature that shaped its legal 
ramifications, but rather whether a law, regardless of its sector, clearly addressed 
the needs of the different ethnoreligious groups.  The formalized minority veto 
mechanism in Bosnia-Herzegovina was particularly subject to abuse, since no 
formal, legal definition exists of what constitutes an infringement on an 
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ethnoreligious community’s interests.  In the case of Lebanon, the informal 
minority veto, present via the equal division of the number of seats in the 
Parliament, amplifies the emphasis on inter-ethnoreligious cooperation.  Since a 
majority vote is all that is necessary to pass a law, no one religious sect can pass a 
law with the cooperation of another.  However, due to the lack of data on laws 
rejected, an in-depth of laws not passed was not possible.  Nevertheless, as the 
literature suggests, overall the Lebanese Parliament is not plagued with consistent 
law blockage, as is the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina, due to the increased, 
arguably over-bearing role, the executive branch plays in the Lebanese legislative 
process.  Overall, it is apparent between these case studies that the formalization 
of consociational arrangements and procedures further entrenches political elites 
into an ethnoreligious-dominated mindset.  The most important conclusion 
nonetheless is that even though a consociational arrangement plays a large role in 
dictating the functioning of a political system, the political elites involved play the 
largest role in ensuring whether or not a political system efficiently functions or 
not.  
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Annex I – Explanation of Political Party Distribution in the House of 
Representatives 
 
Political Parties in BiH’s Parliamentary House of Representatives 
Source: CoE Report, Annex I 
 
In the Federation 
1. Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP): 15.40% FBiH – 5 
seats 
2. Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ): 7.99% FBiH 
– 3 seats  
3. Croats Together (HDZ 1990): 6.10% FBiH – 2 seats  
4. Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party-Sefer Halilović (BPS): 4.41% FBiH – 
1 seat 
5. People's Party Work for Betterment (NSRzB): 3.22% FBiH – 1 seat 
6. Democratic People's Community (DNZ): 1.90% FBiH – 1 seat 
 
In RS 
1. Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD): 46.93% RS – 7 seats  
2. Serbian Democratic Party (SDS): 19.44% RS – 3  seats 
3. RS Party of Democratic Progress (PDP): 5.08% RS – 1 seat 
4. Democratic People's Alliance (DNS): 3.56% RS – 1 seat 
 
In Both the Federation and RS 
1. Party of Democratic Action (SDA): 25.54% FBiH / 3.67% RS – 9 seats 
2. Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH): 22.99% FBiH /4.16% RS – 8 seats 
 
 
Ethnic Structure of the House of Representatives 
8 Croats (all in FBiH entity) 
12 Serbs (all in RS entity) 
22 Bosniaks (2 in RS, 20 in FBiH entity) 
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Annex II – Seat Allocation between Different Confessional Sects in the 
Lebanese Parliament, Post-Ta’if Accords 
Source: “Lebanon after Ta'if: Is the Civil War Over?” 1991 
 
Confession Seats Allocated in Ta’if Accords 
Christians 
Maronite 30 
Orthodox 11 
Catholic 6 
Armenian Orthodox 4 
Armenian Catholic 1 
Protestant 1 
Other 1 
SUBTOTAL 54 
Muslims 
Sunni 22 
Shi’a 22 
Druze 8 
Alawi 2 
SUBTOTAL 54 
TOTAL 108 
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Annex III – Interview Questions, 2009 
Political atmosphere and power-sharing agreements 
1. Please describe to me the level of inter-ethnoreligious party cooperation 
and interaction today. 
a. Depending on response: 
b. What are the biggest factors that obstruct inter-ethnoreligious party 
cooperation? 
c. What factors facilitate inter-ethnoreligious party cooperation? 
2. What are, in your opinion, the most important aspects of governmental 
reform that you believe BiH must currently focus on and why? 
a. What factors have caused these governmental problems?   
b. Do you think these are due to reasons that are structural (e.g. laws) 
or subjective (e.g. influential individuals) reasons, or a 
combination of both? 
3. How have the Dayton Peace Accords shaped the process of ethnoreligious 
reconciliation in BiH?   
4. In your opinion, was the rigidity of the post-war power-sharing 
agreements, in terms of how precise the power was to be shared (i.e. 
creation of the RS and the Federation, parliamentary keys, tri-ethnic 
presidency, etc) appropriate?    
a. Depending on response: 
b. If not, describe why you believe the level of rigidity of the power-
sharing agreements was not properly allocated. 
c. Was it possible for BiH, at the end of the war, to have a less 
formalized and institutionalized power-sharing structure? 
5. Do you think it is necessary for BiH to now reform its power-sharing 
agreements? Why or why not?  
a. What do you believe would be the consequences of trying to 
soften/maintain the rigidity of the ethnoreligiously constructed 
power-sharing arrangements in BiH? 
Ethnoreligious reconciliation 
6. Do you believe the ethnoreligiously-based power-sharing agreements in 
BiH have affected the process of ethnoreligious reconciliation in post-war 
BiH? If so, how? 
a. Should political power-sharing arrangements in BiH strive to 
promote reconciliation? 
7. Do you believe there is a disparity between individuals’ reconciling their 
ethnic differences and those reflected in the political arena?   
a. If yes: 
b. Why do you believe that exists?  
c. Do you believe this is an important, or even a feasible, factor to 
take into account? 
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8. Why do you believe that there is such a disparity between different cities 
within BiH in terms of dealing with ethnoreligious differences, i.e. two 
notable examples being Brcko & Mostar?   
a. If mention governmental structure: 
b. Do you think Brcko’s “informal” power-sharing could be used as a 
model for promoting reconciliation in other ethnoreligiously-
divided cities in BiH?  
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Annex IV – Organizations and Individuals Interviewed, 2009 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
1. Mozaik Foundation, locally-run NGO, Sarajevo 
2. ACIPS, locally-run NGO, Sarajevo 
3. Human Rights Center, locally-run NGO, Sarajevo 
4. TERCA, locally-run NGO, Sarajevo 
5. Nansen Dialogue Center, locally-run NGO, Mostar 
6. Populari, locally-run NGO, Sarajevo 
7. Forum for Tuzla Citizens, locally-run NGO, Tuzla 
8. International Crisis Group, internationally-run organization, Mostar 
9. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), internationally-run 
organization, Sarajevo 
10. Transparency International BiH, internationally-run organization, Sarajevo 
11. International Republican Institute, internationally-run organization, Sarajevo 
12. Naša Stranka, non-ethnoreligious political party, Sarajevo 
13. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in 
BiH, international institution, Sarajevo 
14. Office of the High Representative (OHR), international institution, Sarajevo 
Vienna, Austria 
15. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, international institution 
16. Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights , international institution  
17. Christian Ferdinand Wehrschütz, journalist on the Balkans 
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